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The common law rules of fellow servant, assumption of risk, and
contributory negligence posed a series of daunting obstacles for nineteenth-
century workers seeking to recover for injuries suffered on the job. Strong
opposition to the "unholy trinity"' of the common law's workplace accident
regime began to develop among progressive reformers in the first decade of
the twentieth century. In 1910, New York State enacted the first modem
workmen S2 compensation law in the United States, providing compensation
to injured workers and their families without regard to fault.3 By the end of
the decade an astounding thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and three
U.S. territories had followed New York's lead.'
The transformation of work accident law has been the subject of a large
and sometimes contentious scholarship among historians, lawyers, and social
scientists.' Scholars have generally been inattentive, however, to the ways in
1. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 512 (1941).
2. This Note retains the gender-specific terminology used by contemporaries to describe no-fault
workplace accident laws in order to avoid anachronism. Indeed. the Note seeks (if only in passing) to touch
on ways in which the gendered notion of "manliness" and its relation to work played an important role in
the law and culture of work accidents.
3. See An Act To Amend the Labor Law, in Relation to Workmen's Compensation in Certain
Dangerous Employments, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. Laws 1945. The New York Court of Appeals struck down
the New York legislation in Ives v. South Buffalo Railroad. 94 N.E. 431. 448 (N.Y 1911) (WVerner. J ). but
the legislature reenacted a revised compensation statute after the ratification of a constitutional amendment.
see Workmen's Compensation Law, ch. 816, 1913 N.Y. Laws 2277.
4. See Harry Weiss, Employers' Liability and Itrknen's Compensaton. in 3 Jot R. CoItos Er
AL., HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 564. 575-76 (1935)
5. See, e.g., EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ & KtM MCQUAID, CREATING TlE WELFARE STATE 43-46 (rev
ed. 1992) (arguing that workmen's compensation represented a compromise between labor and capital that
was considered to be in both sides' interest); GuIDO CALABRESi. THE COSTS OF ACCIDE.%"Ts 24546 (1970)
(discussing workmen's compensation as the beginning of modem strict liability in the la%% of torts).
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 242 (1955) (explaining workmen's compensation as an
example of professional-class status anxiety in an age of corporate consolidation). MICIIAEL KAt-zL 1% It
SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 191-95 (1986) (describing workmen's compensation as a "lame attempt" to
solve the problem of industrial accident liability that nonetheless set important precedents for subsequent
welfare state programs); RoY LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY. 1900-1935. at 45-65 (2d
ed. 1986) (describing workmen's compensation as the earliest embodiment of a weak American w elfare
state); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 285-98 (1992) (explaining v"orkmcn's
compensation as an isolated exception to the prevailing early 20th-century resistance to social insurance
legislation that encompassed male workers); James Weinstein. Big Business and the Orgins of Workmen "
Compensation, 8 LAB. HIST. 156, 159-60 (1967) (arguing that workmen's compensation was a central
episode in capitalism's 20th-century project of corporate-liberal hegemony cloaked as humanitarian reform)
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which the transformation of the law of work accidents reflected and gave shape
to an important shift in the ways in which Americans thought about and
organized work itself. This Note argues that the nineteenth-century law of
workplace accidents is perhaps best understood by reference to what historian
Daniel Rodgers has described as nineteenth-century Americans' "moral
preoccupation with labor."
6
The nineteenth-century work ethic contained within itself a critical
ambiguity. For even as the work ethic could sustain ideas about the dignity of
work and the moral value of labor, it could also serve the economic interests
of employers seeking to create a disciplined and industrious workforce. The
contention of Part I of this Note is that the common law of work accidents
captured the deep ambiguities of the nineteenth-century work ethic. In many
instances, nineteenth-century work accident law cynically deployed notions of
the value of worker responsibility and self-reliance in such a way as to obscure
employer power and enforce employee discipline in the workplace. Yet the
common law of work accidents also embodied a limited conception of
managerial control over the processes of production and created a legal regime
that may even have protected the persistence of informal worker discretion
over the processes of production. Workmen's compensation reform on the
other hand-to which the Note turns in Part 1-at once responded to and
accelerated the dramatically expanded managerial control of the workplace
represented by the scientific management revolution of the first decade of the
twentieth century. In one sense, workmen's compensation's commitment to
bringing at least an element of public control into the private power structure
of the employment relation represented an opportunity to reconstruct a
democratic governance of work. As we shall see, however, most supporters of
workmen's compensation sought not so much to democratize the work relation
as to realize the potential of expert managerial administration of work.
For those who had sought to uphold the dignity of meaningful work, then,
workmen's compensation signaled and gave shape to a crisis for the
nineteenth-century work ethic: In a world in which managers controlled even
the details of production, it was no longer clear that labor could meaningfully
be said to do any moral work. This new organization of work posed
particularly acute difficulties for the skilled industrial craftsmen who formed
the heart of the late nineteenth-century labor movement, and Part III describes
the ambiguities of these workers' hesitant but ultimate acceptance of
workmen's compensation. In conclusion, the Note turns to a little-known 1910
proposal by Louis D. Brandeis for special juries of workmen to resolve work
accident cases. For those, like Brandeis, who believed that self-governance in
work was critical to sustaining self-governance in politics, the abandonment of
6. DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1850-1920, at 17 (1978).
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the connection between work and moral virtue required the reconstruction of
a link between self-direction at work and political self-governance.
I. THE LAW OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
A. The Rule of Farwell
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Court set the
path for the American common law of workplace accidents in the 1842 case
of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail Road.' Farwell, an engineer, sought
recovery for injuries sustained when his train was derailed by a switch left
negligently across the tracks by a switchman.' Shaw ruled that the liability of
an employer to his employee was to be determined by reference to the private
agreement of the parties. 9 In the absence of an employer-employee agreement
on who was to bear the cost of work accidents, Shaw continued, considerations
of "justice" and "policy" impelled courts to infer that the employee assumed
all ordinary risks incident to employment. 0 Unlike the passenger, who did
not contract to assume the risks of passage, the worker was in a better position
than the employer to reduce the risk of accidents." Thus, absent indications
to the contrary, the worker would be presumed to have assumed the risks of
injury due to the negligence of a fellow servant.
12
Shaw's decision in Farwell proved to be enormously influential among
nineteenth-century judges. With only a few isolated exceptions, the fellow
servant doctrine and its analog rule, assumption of risk, quickly became the
foundation of the common law approach to workplace accidents." Historians,
7. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). The first recorded common lan case of an employe bnnging a claim
against an employer for injuries suffered in the course of employment was the English cas of Prtestles
v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837), in %%hich the court rejected the claim of a butcher boy injured
by the overturning of his master's cart. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPsoN. LEADING CA- sL I% "rilE COtMo% LAW
100-34 (1995); see also R.W. KOSTAL. LAW AND ENGLSI RAILWAY CAI'ITAuSM 1825-1875. at 257-79
(rev. ed. 1997). In 1841, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a railroad iremnan could not
recover from his employer for damages incurred because of the negligence of a fello% sen ant See Murray
v. South Carolina R.R., 26 S.C.L. (I McMul.) 385 (1841) The court was split. hosclr, and subcquent
cases in other jurisdictions relied on Farvell rather than Murra
8. See Farwell, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 50.
9. See id. at 56.
10. Id. at 57. As Shaw stated,
The general rule, resulting from considerations as well of justice as of policy. is. that he ho
engages in the employment of another for the performance of specified duties and sr iccs,. for
compensation, takes upon himself the natural and ordinary nsks and penhs incident to the
performance of such services, and in legal presumption the compensation is adjusted
accordingly.
Id.
1I. See id. at 57-59. It is significant that in setting this general default rule Sha% ,Isho%%ed little intcrt
in the actual sociology of the workplace, let alone the probability of considerable %anation from one
workplace to another in workers' capacity to prevent accidents
12. See id. at 59.
13. See Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servo,t Rule, 1837. /60. 132
U. PA. L. REv. 579, 594-600 (1984).
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however, have been highly critical of the fellow servant doctrine. According
to the classic view, the rule represented a judicially enacted subsidy to
emerging industries at the expense of workers. 14 More recently, labor law
historian Christopher Tomlins has argued that the fellow servant doctrine was
complicit in the construction of a hierarchical relationship between employer
and employee in the emerging industrial workplace. 15 On this view, the rule
of fellow servant legitimated employer control in the workplace by insulating
inequalities in the industrial workplace from public control.
These critical interpretations bear important truths. Shaw's refusal to inject
public norms into the private contractual relationship of employee and
employer insulated the power disparity between employer and employee from
public intervention; moreover, the common law rules did relieve industries of
the cost of compulsory payment for most of their workers' injuries. But such
interpretations are, in important respects, incomplete. Perhaps more than
anything else, the common law rules reflected a nineteenth-century way of
thinking about and organizing work, the ambivalences of which lend somewhat
more ambiguity to the common law regime than these views allow.
B. Work and Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America
1. Ideology, Work, and Citizenship
For the skilled craftsmen and middling classes of nineteenth-century
America, dignity and self-discipline in productive labor represented one of the
14. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 58 (1967); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND
CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 166 (1957) (observing that at "a critical stage" in the development of American
capitalism, the fellow servant doctrine relieved industry "of an enormous financial burden"); cf MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 210 (1977) (arguing that the fellow
servant doctrine "ratiffied] those forms of inequality that the market system produced"). The difficulty with
the subsidy thesis is not, as law and economics scholars have argued, that the rules of fellow servant were
in fact efficient, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 44-45 (1972),
or even that they were efficient with respect to the railroad industry, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Character
of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 709-12 (1989). Instead, the problem with the subsidy
thesis is that it is impossible to deduce particular legal doctrines from the general abstraction of the "needs"
of an expanding market economy. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57,
75-78 (1984). For accounts that look to ideological factors to explain the common law workplace accident
cases, see Alfred S. Konefsky, "As Best To Subserve Their Own Interests": Lemuel Shaw Labor
Conspiracy, and Fellow Servants, 7 LAW & HIST. REV. 219, 229-35 (1989); and Comment, supra note 13,
at 594-600. For an important recent reinterpretation, see SIMPSON, supra note 7, at 127, which argues that
the early common law work accident cases represented a critical "first step towards a world in which tort
law became a candidate for the job of replacing the older mechanisms of support" such as a master's
obligation to care for domestic servants or the parish's responsibility to care for the sick or injured poor.
15. See CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC
306-84 (1993); see also KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM 107-08 (1991) (arguing that the fellow
servant doctrine organized the law of workplace accidents around a model of status relations rather than
contract relations).
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critical components of the moral foundation of a self-governing citizenry. 6
There were, of course, sharp differences of opinion over how work contributed
to moral virtue and over what kind of work was required to sustain such
virtue. For the skilled artisan craftsmen who held on to the republicanism of
the late eighteenth century, preservation of republican self-government rested
on citizens' ownership of the means of the production; only the economically
independent producer would be free of the relationships of dependence that
threatened to corrupt virtuous self-government. 7 Among elites, a different,
narrower conception of free labor began to emerge in the years before the Civil
War. On this view-which bore important traces of classical political economy
and of the Enlightenment idea of possessive individualism'"-the status of
wage earner rather than independent owner-producer was sufficient to sustain
a narrowed conception of the relationship between work and virtue.'
Yet for all the internal divisions within the nineteenth-century ethic of free
labor, many of the competing conceptions of free labor shared a rhetorical
commitment to the dignity and importance of work. Skilled workers and elites
alike argued that a worker's skill and his exercise of judgment and discretion
over work processes served an educative function, training citizens for the
work of self-government by their participation in the governance of work
processes. For English immigrant and mechanic Timothy Claxton in the 1830s,
as for Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen leader and editor William Sayre in
the 1870s, dignified and productive labor served as the foundation of personal
and national virtue.20 Similarly, middle-class reformers such as New York
Tribune editor Horace Greeley and Unitarian William Ellery Channing believed
that the processes of labor were closely linked to the "mental development and
16. See LEON FINK, WORKINGMEN'S DEMOCRACY 4. 9 (1985); DAVID Mo%-rcomIERY. CmZE%
WORKER 13-51 (1993); RODGERS, supra note 6. passim; ALAN TRACI'E.NBERG. THiE INCORPORA.TION OF
AMERICA 74 (1982); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC 92-97 (1984): Leon Fink. The Nei Labor
History and the Powers of Historical Pessumism: Consensus. Hegemnon). and the Case of the Knights of
Labor, 75 J. AM. HIST. 115 (1988). On the origins of Amencans' establishment of work as a cnttcal
constituent element of democratic citizenship, see GORDON S. WOOD. TIlE RADICAUSM 1OF TIE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 32-36, 276-86 (1992); and Gordon S. Wood. Ideolog and the Origins of Liberal America.
44 WM. & MARY Q. 628, 639-40 (1987).
17. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL. FREE LABOR. FREE MEN 16-17 (1970). WIINT/_. supra note 16, al
92-97; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF TIlE AMERICAN REP BLIC. 1776-1787. at 168-69 (1969).
Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early Atnerican Republic. 41 STAN L Riv 335. 338
(1989); Sean Wilentz, Against Erceptionalhsin: Class Consciousness and the American Labor Mov ement.
1790-1920, 26 INT'L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. I. 6-13 (1984).
18. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDLUALISM 137-59 (1962)
19. See Steinfeld, supra note 17. at 348-49: see also \Vilham E Forbath. The Ambiguities of Free
Labor, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 767, 772-82.
20. In Sayre's view, "[t]he government ... Iwas) the fruit of labor" and the laborer was the "lord of
the realm." What Labor Is, 3 LOCOMOTIVE FIRElMEN'S MONTILN MAG 272. 272 (1879) Sayre. the
magazine's editor, believed that '[ilf the arm of labor is parahzed. the nation perishes" Id For Claxton.
the "self-respect" inculcated by the diligence and creativity of work as a machinist or small-scale insentor.
and the general mutual improvement of the laboring classes thai accompanied such 5killed sork. would
redound to the "benefit lof] the community at large.' TIMOTIIY CLAXTON. MEMOIR OF A IEChANIC 91.
169 (Boston, George W. Light 1839). On workers" commitment to the dignit) and "alue of stork. sec
RODGERS, supra note 6, at 174-77.
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moral culture" of a self-governing citizenry.3 Indeed, for Channing, it was
the very "pains" that work could and did inflict that performed the morally
constitutive work of labor. "[B]y its perils, which demand continuous
vigilance," he argued, economic life developed critical moral and mental
faculties.22
For those schooled in the ideology of republicanism, the expansion of
wage earning as a permanent status for the working classes threatened to
undermine the kind of economic autonomy necessary to sustain independent
citizenship.23 But for others, skill in a trade and the capacity to exercise
discretion over work could provide a modicum of economic independence for
skilled workers even within the wage-labor employment relation.24 Skill in
a trade could function as a kind of property, providing its owner with some of
the same kinds of economic independence that had characterized the
independent craftsmen of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.2'
Thus, in addition to training workers for citizenship, skilled wage labor could
sustain a modicum of the economic independence that had once been found in
independent artisanal crafts.26
The work ethic, however, could also be put to uses that undermined
worker independence. In the hands of employers, affirmations of the value of
manual labor often served not so much to uphold the dignity of labor as to
legitimate new forms of industrial exploitation.27 The moral value of work
could become a moral imperative to labor, with less regard for the moral virtue
that work could inculcate than for the maintenance of a bourgeois social order
constructed at the expense of the laboring poor.28 Social Darwinist William
21. HORACE GREELEY, RECOLLECTIONS OF A BusY LIFE 498 (New York, J.B. Ford & Co. 1868); see
also 5 WILLIAM E. CHANNING, THE WORKS OF WILLIAM E. CHANNING, D.D. 158 (Boston, Crosby, Nichols
& Co. 12th ed. 1857). For Greeley, work and industry were necessary elements in the moral development
of citizens because "[]luxury enervate[d] the body and debase[d] the soul." GREELEY, supra, at 499.
22. 5 CHANNING, supra note 21, at 158.
23. Of course, as Robert Steinfeld observes, even ostensibly self-sufficient artisans were in many ways
enmeshed in relations of interdependence. See Steinfeld, supra note 17, at 359-60.
24. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA 13-14 (1979) (describing skilled
workers' capacity to exercise market power in the negotiation of work relations).
25. See John Rule, The Property of Skill in the Period of Manufacture, in THE HISTORICAL MEANINGS
OF WORK 99, 99-118 (Patrick Joyce ed., 1987).
26. Conceptions of citizenship that linked a modicum of independence in work--defined narrowly or
broadly-to citizenship were often sharply exclusive. See, e.g., DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF
WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991) (describing the
construction of a white working-class identity); Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights
of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471 (1988) (describing the ways in which 19th-
century free labor ideology was predicated on male property rights in female labor). But see TERENCE
VINCENT POWDERLY, THIRTY YEARS OF LABOR 1859-1889, at 631-32,651-62 (Columbus, Ohio, Excelsior
Publ'g House 1889) (describing the broadly inclusive nature of the Knights of Labor's late 19th-ccntury
producer ideology).
27. See JONATHAN A. GLICKSTEIN, CONCEPTS OF FREE LABOR IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 262 (1991)
(describing the different ways in which the idea of the dignity of labor could be deployed); RODGERS, supra
note 6, at 210-32 (describing the ideological uses to which the work ethic was put).
28. On the ways in which the moral value of work was transformed into a moral imperative to work
by elites in the late 19th century, see Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars Can't Be Choosers: Compulsion and
[Vol. 107: 14671472
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Graham Sumner, for example, argued that the correspondence "between work
and reward" was the foundation of personal responsibility." For Sumner, that
correspondence served to stigmatize "the woes of poverty ... [and] the
penalties of idleness. ' 3° The role of "the faithful workman" in Sumner's view
was to "subject himself to discipline."-31 In this incarnation of the work ethic,
bodily pain-even "the plucking out [of] an eye or cutting off [of] a limb," to
use the words of New York charity organizer Josephine Shaw Lowell-served
the critical role of disciplining the immoral poor who refused to work.'"
2. Control over the Processes of Production in the Nineteenth Century
The plausibility of the nineteenth-century work ethic-in all of its
forms-was sustained by an organization of work that, at least among the
skilled white male industrial workers to whom the work ethic was usually
attached, often left considerable room for worker discretion. To be sure,
workers' informal control of work processes was often hotly contested by
employers. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the material conditions
that had sustained the artisanal republicanism of the early republic had been
substantially undermined by growing inequality between master and
journeyman and by the emergence of wage labor as the dominant economic
relationship. 33 Moreover, many employers sought to impose their own control
over work through hierarchical shop-floor discipline of their workforces. Such
employers posted workplace regulations,- demanded that workers accustomed
to preindustrial agricultural rhythms adapt themselves to new and rigid work
schedules, 35 and established a new class of foremen and room overseers to
supervise the processes of production.:
Contract in Postbellum America, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1265 (1992). which descnbes an increase in vagrancy
prosecutions and coercive enforcement of labor discipline among the laboring poor in the 1870s
29. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, The Shifting ofResponstbditv. in 2 ESSAYS 01- WILLIAM GRAIIAI
SUMNER 260, 261 (Albert Galloway Keller & Maunce R. Da ic eds. 1934) (1887)
30. Id. at 262.
31. Id. at 261.
32. JOSEPHINE SHAW LOWELL, PUBLIC RELIEF AND PRIVATE CIARITY 94 (Amo Press & The New
York Times 1971) (1884). Josephine Shaw Lowell was not related to Chief Justice Shay,
33. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY. LABOR AND TIlE RADICAL REPt BtJC.\%S 1862-
1872, at 30 (1967) (estimating that roughly two-thirds of those who vorked outside the home sere wage
earners by 1870); RODGERS. supra note 6. at 36-37 & 250 n 12 (same)
34. For examples of workplace regulations and employers' attempts to enforce them. ee JOATIIA%
PRUDE, THE COMING OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER: TOWN AND FACTORY LIFE IN RL RAL MASSACII SETTS. 1810-
1860, at 129-31 (1983); ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE. ROCKDALE: TttE GROWTIH OF AN AMERICAN VILLAGE
IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 178-79 (1978): and DAVID A. ZODERMAN. ASPIRATIONS AND
ANXIETIES: NEW ENGLAND FACTORY WORKERS AND THE MECIIANI7ED FACTORY S'irSTIE 1815-1850, at
144-62 (1992).
35. See HERBERT G. GUTMAN, WORK, CULLTURE. AND SOCIETY IN INDL STRIALIZG AMERICA 3-78
(1977); cf. E.P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline. and Industrial Capitahsim. 38 PAST & PRhhENT" 56. 79-
95 (1967) (describing the collision of preindustrial work rhythms and industrial factor) management in
18th- and early- I9th-century England).
36. See PRUDE, supra note 34, at 82-84. Employer control was particularly effecti'e in the textile
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Yet recent scholarship has revealed that a number of nineteenth-century
firms and industries adopted management practices and strategies that relied
on the preservation of a skilled workforce.37 Such firms did not engage in the
harsh deskilling and hierarchical rulemaking that characterized industrial work
in places such as the New England textile mills. At the Baldwin Locomotive
Works in Philadelphia, for example, a producerist ethic linked employers and
workers together as partners in the work of skilled production. 8 Moreover,
even as some employers sought to impose new forms of discipline in the
industrial workplace, workers actively resisted their attempts and were often
able to retain considerable discretion in the direction of their labor.39 Indeed,
in many emerging forms of industrial work, workers were able to establish
considerable amounts of discretion and control over their labor. Practices such
as inside contracting permitted skilled workers to take charge of particular
production projects.4 In iron rolling, for example, workers collectively
contracted with their employer on only the total tonnage rate and controlled the
division of labor and the allocation of pay themselves." For other skilled
factories of New England and Pennsylvania, which employed large numbers of unskilled workers, many
of them women. See THOMAS DUBLIN, WOMEN AT WORK: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK AND
COMMUNITY IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS, 1826-1860, at 59-60 (1979); see also WALTER LICIT,
INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 29 (1995) (describing the centralization of
production in New England industries in 1830s and 1840s); CYNTHIA J. SHELTON, THE MILLS OF
MANAYUNK: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN THE PHILADELPHIA REGION, 1787-1837, at 63-
64,73 (1986) (describing managerial rulemaking and the replacement of skilled, independent male workers
with labor-saving machinery and female operatives in Pennsylvania textile firms in the 1820s); CHRISTINE
STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEW YORK, 1789-1860, at 121-23 (1986) (noting that in
industries employing large numbers of women, work relations between male employers and female
employees were often constructed along familial lines in accordance with views of the propriety of
patriarchal control of the family). Moreover, new technologies such as the sewing machine transformed
industries like shoemaking and garmentmaking and still further reduced workers' capacity to exercise skill
and discretion over work processes. See MARY H. BLEWET, MEN, WOMEN, AND WORK: CLASS, GENDER,
AND PROTEST IN THE NEW ENGLAND SHOE INDUSTRY, 1780-1910, at 97 (1988); ALAN DAWLEY, CLASS
AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN 76-78, 90-96 (1976); Jonathan Prude,
Capitalism, Industrialization, and the Factory in Post-Revolutionary America, in WAGES OF INDEPENDENCE:
CAPITALISM IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 81, 92-93 (Paul A. Gilje ed., 1997) (hereinafter WAGES
OF INDEPENDENCE].
37. See, e.g., JOHN K. BROWN, THE BALDWIN LOCOMOTIVE WORKS 1831-1915, at 125, 130-32
(1995); PHILIP SCRANTON, PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM: THE TEXTILE MANUFACTURE AT PHILADELPIIIA,
1800-1885, at 52-53, 314-52 (1983).
38. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 37, at 95 (describing employer-employee relations and the culture
of work at the Baldwin Locomotive Works in Philadelphia).
39. See, e.g., ZONDERMAN, supra note 34, at 56-61 (describing machinists' reactions to
industrialization in the 1840s and arguing that machinists developed a conception of themselves as
"industrial artisan[s]"); Richard Stott, Artisans and Capitalist Development, in WAGES OF INDEPENDENCE,
supra note 36, at 101, 105-07 (describing the continuity of work practices in many trades into the late 19th
century).
40. On inside contracting, see BROWN, supra note 37, at 115-19; DAN CLAWSON, BUREAUCRACY AND
THE LABOR PROCESS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. INDUSTRY, 1860-1920, at 71-125 (1980); LICHIT,
supra note 36, at 129-30; DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE,
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTVISM, 1865-1925, at 9-19 (1987); John Buttrick, The Inside
Contract System, 12 J. ECON. HIST. 205 (1952); and Ernest J. Englander, Tire Inside Contract System of
Production and Organization: A Neglected Aspect of the History of the Firm, 28 LAB. HIST. 429 (1987).
41. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 40, at 9-19.
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craftsmen such as coal miners, steel workers, and machinists, specialized skills
and knowledge made it possible to remain relatively self-directing in the details
of industrial work processes.42 Even late into the nineteenth century, skilled
workers were able to employ union work rules and cross-union sympathy
strikes to maintain a modicum of collective self-direction in the processes of
production.43
Railroads developed some of the earliest recognizably modern industrial
management practices, including long codes of workplace regulations to govern
workers' conduct in the workplace.4 Despite railroad company attempts to
introduce new modes of managerial control, however, engineers, firemen,
brakemen, and conductors maintained considerable informal control over the
day-to-day conduct of their work by persistently ignoring or deliberately
defying railroad company work rules in favor of customs and practices they
had developed among themselves. " Moreover, until late in the century,
railroad managerial practices, such as the tradition of assigning work crews
their own engines and the relatively clumsy and erratic use of suspensions as
a mode of enforcing work rules, may have fostered a culture of worker control
in ways wholly unintended by management.
46
C. The Conmon Law of Work Accidents and Workplace Control
Courts played a central role in structuring the control of the emerging
industrial workplace. Early- and mid-nineteenth-century American courts
dismantled many of the disciplinary powers of eighteenth-century
employers.47 Yet these same courts also helped to construct a new mode of
42. See DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMF.RICA 3-4 (1980) (discussing coal mners). JA-IES
WHITESIDE, REGULATING DANGER: TIlE STRUGGLE FOR MINE SAI-i- I% TIlL RocK'i MOlt 'rAI% COAL
INDUSTRY 43-44 (1990) (same): MONTGOMERY, supra note 40. at 10-22 (discussing steel workers). DAVID
MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA II (1979) (discussmg worker control among "ilron
molders, glass blowers, coopers, paper machine tenders. Iocomoti'.c engineers, mule spinners, boiler
makers, pipe fitters, typographers, jiggermen in potteries. coal miners, iron rollers, puddlers and heaters.
the operators of McKay or Goodyear stitching machines in shoe factories, and. in many instances.
journeymen machinists and fitters in metal works").
43. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 42, at 10. 15-27
44. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER. JR.. TIlE VISIBL: HAD TIlE M|A%AGERIAL RI ,'OLL"IO% 1%
AMERICAN BUSINESS 81-144 (1977) (describing the deelopmenit of nes, managerial tchnologies by
railroad companies); WALTER LICHT, WORKING FOR TIlE RAILROAD 80-89 (1983) (descnbing railroad work
rules); see also JAMES H. DUCKER, MEN OF TlE STEEL RAILS 30-33 (19831 (same)
45. See LICHT, supra note 44, at 93-111. Railroad %,orkers. managers complained, did not hae "'the
right kind of sentiment." Id. at 97. They were continuously selling their ovn *'rules for the regulation of
their own conduct." Id.; cf Murray v. South Carolina R R. 26 S C L (I McMul ) 385. 386 118411
(describing a worker plaintiff who selected on his own the engine and crey, with wshich he wsould ssork)
46. In the 1890s, railroad companies began to shift to a method of "pooling" engines such that work
crews were no longer able to learn the quirks and charactenstics of a single piece of machinery See
DUCKER, supra note 44. at 117-18. In these same \ears. the railroads moed asway from clumsy and
arbitrary suspensions and firings and developed a complex scheme of menits and demenits tlul allosed them
to exercise considerably more subtle forms of work rule enforcement See id at 38-39
47. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD. TilE INVENTno- OFR FRIu. LAIOR 143-50, 152-53 119911 (dccnbing
the demise of specific enforcement and criminal sanctions to enforce labor contracts and the rise of criminal
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employer control in the nineteenth-century workplace. Doctrines such as the
"entire contract" rule, which denied workers' quantum meruit claims for back
pay when they quit before the end of the term of an employment contract,
48
and the enforcement of employer work rules and notice requirements as
binding terms of the employment contract, even when the rules had been
modified during the course of employment, systematically disadvantaged
employees.49 In these respects, the nineteenth-century law of employment
adopted a contractual approach to the employment relation that could serve to
obscure and render indirect an employer's power to coerce his employees.50
The nineteenth-century law of workplace accidents captured the
ambiguities of the legal construction of the industrial workplace. The common
law rules could allow contract to become compulsion, thereby obscuring the
exercise of employer power. Courts adjudicating work accident cases, for
example, adopted employer-made work rules and employers' orders as setting
the terms of the employment relationship and rewarded employee obedience
to those rules and orders. Thus, the doctrine of employee work-rule violations
held almost uniformly that an employee injured while violating an employer
order or work rule was guilty of contributory negligence and thus unable to
recover. 
5
cases. brought against employers and supervisors for physically disciplining employees); see also TERESA
ANNE MURPHY, TEN HOURS' LABOR: RELIGION, REFORM, & GENDER IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND 1-2 (1992)
(describing the criminal sanctions levied against a New England mill foreman for whipping a female mill
hand).
48. See, e.g., Stark v. Parker, 19 Mass. 267 (1824); see generally Wythe Holt, Recovery by the Worker
Who Quits: A Comparison of the Mainstream, Legal Realist, and Critical Legal Studies Approaches to a
Problem of Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 677 (arguing that courts began to deny
workers' quantum meruit claims in the first half of the 19th century); Peter Karsten, "Bottomed on
Justice": A Reappraisal of Critical Legal Studies Scholarship Concerning Breaches of Labor Contracts by
Quitting or Firing in Britain and the U.S., 1630-1880,34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 213 (1990) (arguing that the
entire contract rule was not a new orthodoxy but rather marked a continuity with I8th-century law).
49. See TOMLINS, supra note 15, at 284-90 (describing courts' enforcement of employer work rules).
Other examples include the doctrine of enticement, which punished unions and employers who encouraged
employees to exit from existing employment relations, see, e.g., Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871)
(deciding a civil action against a strike leader for interference with the employment relation between an
employer and shoemakers who had not signed a contract and who were paid by the piece); Carew v.
Rutherford, 106 Mass. I (1870) (upholding an employer suit against a labor union for enticing workers to
strike); ORREN, supra note 15, at 105-08, 122-28 (describing the law of enticement); TOMLINS, supra note
15, at 280-84 (same), and the enforcement of broad criminal conspiracy and restraint-of-trade rules, see
VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER 30-75 (1993); TOMLINS, supra note 15, at 107-
219.
50. Cf. STEINFELD, supra note 47, at 157 (arguing that the "power that remained with the employers
was no longer the legal power directly to coerce but the legal power indirectly to coerce by withholding
from workers the means of subsistence").
51. See, e.g., Rome & D.R.R. v. Chasteen, 7 So. 94, 97 (Ala. 1889) (rejecting a jury charge that would
have allowed an employee to recover from a railroad company for injuries arising out of a violation of
railroad company orders); O'Brien v. Staples Coal Co., 43 N.E. 181, 181 (Mass. 1896) (upholding a
directed verdict against an employee injured while crossing over a hoisting apparatus in violation of
employer orders). See generally I C.B. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
§§ 363-67, at 941-67 (1904) (collecting cases). Failure to adopt the common law doctrine of employee
work rule violations, argued supporters of the common law rules, would undermine employer control by
allowing employees to recover regardless of their obedience to the employers' rules. See Little Miami R.R.
v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415, 428 (1851) (arguing that abandoning common law would mean that "no matter
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Moreover, in work accident cases courts put the nineteenth-century work
ethic to dubious use by affirming the importance of worker control over their
work and their working conditions in ways that placed the blame for accidents
on the workers themselves-even in cases in which the injured employee could
not have influenced or controlled the circumstances leading to the accident. By
turning the work ethic into a moral imperative, the injured worker, like the
unemployed worker, became morally suspect for failing to live up to his
responsibility for the conditions of his work.5 2 In such cases, courts deflected
the issue of employers' power over their employees by appealing to the work
ethic and the notion that moral character inhered in the sound exercise of
discretion in the workplace. 3
Nonetheless, when courts asserted that employees "knew as much with
respect to the safety of the [workiplace" as their employers," they appear to
have been engaged in something other than willful hypocrisy. Nineteenth-
century work accident cases articulated a remarkably narrow conception of the
possibilities for pervasive and far-reaching managerial control of the
workplace. The courts accordingly denied claims when they arose out of "one
what rules the board of Directors establish for the safer of life and propery, still the agent may or may
not observe them as he pleases [without any impact on his chances of recovery]") On this point in the
English law of work accidents, see KOSTAL. supra note 7. at 265 See also Pnestley % Fowler. 150 Eng,
Rep. 1030, 1033 (Ex. 1837) ("[T]o allow this sort of action to prevail would be an encouragement to the
servant to omit that diligence and caution which he is in duty bound to exercise on the behalf of his
master.").
52. See, e.g., Honner v. Illinois Cent. R.R.. 15 111. 550. 552 (1854) (contending that the dangers of
industrial work "depend[ed] very much upon the skill and care of the servants of the company"). see also
Chicago & Great E. Ry. v. Harney, 28 Ind. 28. 30 (1867) (claiming that an emplo)ee "has. commonly.
better opportunities than the employer of learning the incompetency or carelessness of his fellow-servant").
Sullivan v. Mississippi & Mo. R.R.. II Iowa 421. 424 (1860) (arguing that employees could "better
guard against such risks and accidents, than could the employer"). Parker v. Hannibal & St, J R.R. 19 S W
1119, 1127 (Mo. 1892) (Black, J., concurring) (concumng in the denial of a worker's claim on the ground
that safety on the track depended "on the care and skill with which each shall perform his appropriate
duty"); Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R.R., 23 Pa. 384. 385 (1854) (contending that employees "ought to
know more" about their working conditions than their emploers)
53. In Farwell, Shaw argued that the fellow servant doctnne rested on the "great pnnciple of social
duty" that required every man to be responsible to himself and others "im the management of his osn
affairs." Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49. 55-56 (1842) Such uses of the idea of
personal responsibility-especially given that Famell's injury %%as due to the negligence of a switchman
whom Farwell had likely never met and over whom Farcll certamly had no control-functioned to
obscure (I) that employees on the railroads were in fact engaged in wage labor for the benefit of the
railroad company and its shareholders: and (2) that the legally constructed employment relation did not give
employees the kind of power that they would have needed to exercise such responsibility over their
working conditions. William Graham Sumner's % iews. expressed in an 1887 essay, performed precisely the
same work. According to Sumner. the common law of work accidents properly described employees as
"independent members of society, each pursuing happiness in his own %a) " SL %INER. jupra note 29. at
263. The law, on this view, served the salutary function of promoting employee responsibility for working
conditions. Yet just a paragraph later Sumner observed that because the worker (like the bondholder) held
a "specific" or fixed interest in the firm and thus was "free from nsk." he %%as properly "'excluded from
control" of the firm. Id. at 264. Sumner. then. affirmed the value of employee responsibility for the nsks
of work even as he precluded workers from exercising the kind of control that could hase influenced
working conditions.
54. Kimmer v. Weber, 45 N.E. 860. 861 (N.Y 1897)
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of the details of the business that is generally left to the workmen
themselves. 55 A master, it was held, was not bound to "supervise and direct
every detail of [his workers'] labor., 56 Consequently, courts declined to
extend an employer's duty of "personal supervision" "down in the chain of
delegated appointments. 57 Instead, they held that a railroad was not
responsible for supervising the details of the work process;58 that an employer
was not obliged to "oversee and supervise the execution detail of all
mechanical work carried on under his employment";59 and that an employer
was "justified in leaving to [the employees] the exercise of their own discretion
and judgment.' 60
By contrast, the few judges who rejected the fellow servant rule and
upheld employers' vicarious liability for the negligence of one employee that
resulted in injury to another did so by appealing to the importance of effective
managerial control over the workplace. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected
the fellow servant doctrine by articulating a broad conception of employer
control and arguing that such control over the conduct of employees implied
an obligation to pay for injuries to one employee caused by another
employee's negligence.6' In the Wisconsin court's view, the fellow servant
rule "overlook[ed] the real influence which the liability to an action" would
have on employers to exert control over the processes of production in order
to reduce accident risks.62 Along slightly different lines, Justice Robert B.
Warden of the Ohio Supreme Court claimed that the law ought to reward
employee obedience by ensuring that obedient employees recovered. 63 He
argued against adoption of the fellow servant rule because an employee who
"agree[d] to be faithful" ought to be able to recover from his employer for the
negligence of a fellow employee. 64 Warden even speculated that the employee
"watchfulness" that the common law rules claimed to promote might be turned
by employees against their superiors and would thus "be an end of all...
subordination" in the workplace. 65
55. Id.
56. 2 LABATr, supra note 51, § 586, at 1719 n.1.
57. Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Dolan, 32 Mich. 510, 513 (1875).
58. See, e.g., Central R.R. v. Keegan, 160 U.S. 259, 267 (1895).
59. Hussey v. Coger, 20 N.E. 556, 559 (N.Y. 1889).
60. Besel v. New York C. & H.R.R.R., 70 N.Y. 171, 176 (1877).
61. See Chamberlain v. Milwaukee & Miss. R.R., II Wis. 238, 251-56 (1860). The Wisconsin court
was the only state supreme court squarely to reject the fellow servant doctrine, but it soon overruled itself
in Moseley v. Chamberlain, 18 Wis. 700 (1867).
62. Chamberlain v. Milwaukee & Miss. R.R., I I Wis. at 255.
63. See Cleveland, C. & C.R.R. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201, 227 (1854) (Warden, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 225. Justice Warden suggested that the fellow servant doctrine would nonetheless be
appropriate for those employments "in which large and uncontrollable masses of men engage." Id. at 226.
The extent to which employees' mutual watchfulness could subvert authority calls into question Tomlins's
contention that the common law rules imposed an Orwellian "constant gaze of self-imposed or peer-
imposed discipline" on workers. TOMLINS, st1pra note 15, at 362. The interdependence of workers looks
as much like mutual solidarity as Orwellian surveillance.
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Just as courts seeking to extend liability were required to invoke a broad
conception of employer control of work processes, injured employees were
required to appeal to a notion of broad employer responsibility for the
workplace in order to frame claims of vicarious liability against employers. In
the 1837 case of Barnes v. Boston & Worcester Railroad,66 for example, the
Massachusetts Court of Common Pleas sustained the claim of an injured
railroad employee similar to the claim brought several years later in
Farwell.67 According to Tomlins, the case represented the law's opportunity
to recognize the "public interest in the conditions prevailing in industrial
workplaces. 68 Yet Barnes's claim appears to have advanced the idea that,
like the master of a former age, the employer possessed a quasi-jurisdictional
responsibility for the workplace. 69 As historian Robert Wiebe has observed,
the Barnes case adopted a language of deference. Counsel for Barnes denied
any intention of attacking the "numerous excellent gentlemen" of the railroad
company's management. 71 Instead, he appealed to the notion that the railroad
had been obliged to "provide Barnes with a safe means of transportation.""
Yet in making that appeal, Barnes was required to frame his argument in a
way that could legitimate the control of his employer. The critical point was
that the railroad was responsible for Barnes's injury because its management
66. Barnes is not a reported case. We know of Barnes thanks to Tomlinss research efforts See
TOMLINS, supra note 15, at 301-03, 331-33, 341-47.
67. The court made a preliminary finding in favor of the employee, but while the railroad company's
appeal was pending, the parties consented to submit the case to arbitration. The employee was awarded
$3000 in damages in the arbitration proceeding. See id. at 331-32. 345.
68. Id. at 346.
69. In the 18th century, employers' obligations for the upkeep of injured servants had ben linked to
hierarchical status relations that gave employers considerable disciplinary authority over the employees for
whose health and upkeep they were responsible. On the colonial practice of enjoining from "putting out"
sick or injured apprentices and indentured servants, see STEINFELD. supra note 47. at 25. 49. 59. 154-55
This legal obligation did not extend to wage laborers, who were not understood to be within the household
jurisdiction of the master. See id. at 25. Nonetheless, even as late as the Earl) Republic. the distinction
between wage and domestic labor was blurred by a household model of economy in which residence and
work were often overlapping categories and in which wages were often paid in the form of room and board
See ELIZABETH BLACKMAR, MANHATTAN FOR RENT, 1785-1850. at 51-60 (1989) (describing the practice
of "found labor" in artisanal shops). Even after the development of the fellow sers ant rule. ,la.es and
seamen were exempted from the contractarian logic of the law% of vworkplace accidents Set- Ti otA.s D
MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW. 1619-1860. at 147-58 (1996) (discussing the considerable
scholarship on the application of work accident doctrines to slaves and arguing that southern law%
approached the fellow servant problem from the legal framework of the law of bailmnts. thus treating the
slave as property within the control of the bailee): see also The City of Alexandria. 17 F 390. 393-96
(S.D.N.Y. 1883) (holding that seamen are "entitled to be cured of all sickness or injuries occumng whilc
in the ship's service" but noting that the "rule is limited to the cure of sickness or injuries, and does not
include any compensation or allowance for the effects of the injury"). Like sla'es. s.camen were bound into
their employment by employer disciplinary powers unknown to the free-labor cmployment relation See
MARCUS REDIKER, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP B.L'E SEA 186-98 11987) (decnbing labor
discipline on ships).
70. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DLMOCRACY 93 (1995)
71. ToMLINS, supra note 15, at 332 (quoting Abraham Moore. Barnes's counsel)
72. Id.
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had controlled the operations.73 Employees, then, were required by the
structure of the law of work accidents to shape their claims in a way that
affirmed employers' control over their own work.74
The rules of fellow servant, assumption of risk, and contributory
negligence may even have encouraged the persistence of informal worker
control within the wage labor employment relation by structuring the law to
minimize employers' interests in exercising thorough control over production.
To be sure, the common law rules could create positive incentives for
employee obedience. But employees' first priority must surely have been to
avoid accidents altogether rather than obey work rules in order to retain the
ability to recover in case of accident. For employers, on the other hand, a legal
regime that imposed liability for work accidents could have created incentives
to increase the extent of their control over the workplace and over the day-to-
day conduct of employees. The courts themselves appear to have believed that
there was a correspondence between liability and control. As we have already
seen, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's rejection of the common law rules rested
in part on the claim that increased exposure to liability would induce
employers to exert increased control over production. Moreover, in accident
cases involving passengers rather than workers, the U.S. Supreme Court argued
that it was necessary to preserve employers' vicarious liability for accidents
arising out of employee work rule violations in order to ensure that employers
exerted "the most stringent enforcement of discipline"76 over their employees.
73. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Barnes was a recently hired maintenance worker rather than
an engineer, fireman, or conductor, the employees that constituted the elite of the railway workers. See
id. at 301.
74. The Barnes case was hardly an isolated example of plaintiffs' appealing to principles of managerial
control. In Olson v. Clyde, 39 N.Y. 425, 428 (1884), an injured worker argued that his case did not fall
within the fellow servant doctrine because, like seamen, he had been bound to obey the orders of superiors
at the pain of punishment by law. Likewise, in Cleveland, Cohmbus & Cincinnati Railroad v. Keary, 3
Ohio St. 201, 203 (1854), the plaintiff's position was that where the employer had placed "one person in
his employ under the direction of another," and where the subordinate employee "was acting under his
orders and control, at the time he received the injury," a plaintiff might recover despite the general validity
of the fellow servant rule. It is precisely this way in which the law shapes an individual's claim so as to
legitimate authority that some historians have identified as the source of law's hegemonic power. See, e.g.,
EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 27 (1974) (arguing that the hegemonic function of the law
resides in its power to frame the claims of the subordinated in terms set by those in authority (citing
ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 247 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell
Smith eds. & trans., International Publishers 1971) (1948))). The point here is that the common law of work
accidents discouraged this kind of hegemonic formation by rejecting claims that tacitly appealed to and
legitimated employer authority. Of course, as Genovese's interpretation of the law of slavery argues, the
law's rejection of claims could serve to reproduce private forms of authority by leaving workers (or, in
Genovese's account, slaves) with nowhere to turn except to the paternalism of the employer (or master).
As almost all writers on the subject agree, however, employer benevolence in accident cases was spotty
at best. See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 44, at 201-I1. Only in the last third of the 19th century did some firms
begin to develop private accident compensation funds. See Robert Asher, The Limits of Big Business
Paternalism: Relief for Injured Workers in the Years Before Workmen's Compensation, in DYING FOR
WORK 19, 21-23 (David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz eds., 1989).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
76. Philadelphia & R.R.R. v. Derby, 55 U.S. 468, 487 (1852). As Justice Grier explained,
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Common law rules that limited the scope of liability, on the other hand,
structured the law so as to relieve employers of the imperative of such
"stringent enforcement" and in the process may have fostered a zone of
relative autonomy for workers out on the rails or on the shop floor.
D. The Politics of Nineteenth-Centur Work Accident Law
Like the ideology of free labor generally, the common law of work
accidents was constructed in contradistinction to the relations of dependence
and obligation that characterized slavery and indentured servitude. 7 This
dynamic had a deeply ambiguous impact on free labor in the North. The
dignity that nineteenth-century Americans attributed to free labor became one
of the foundations of the producer ideology of workers who sought to defend
the dignity of their work and to better their working conditions. Yet the
construction of the free labor employment relationship against the backdrop of
an unfree "other" was in some ways a selective response to labor coercion that
had the effect of legitimating nonslave forms of labor exploitation.7"
Noting the ambiguity of the free labor relation is not to say that the
common law of work accidents did not in each case favor employers over
injured workers. It did, of course. But at the same time, the common law of
work accidents reproduced the full ambiguity of the work ethic that-for
sometimes very different reasons-so preoccupied a wide range of nineteenth-
century Americans. The ideal of self-direction in work and responsibility for
one's working life and conditions could, in the hands of the courts in work
accident cases, become ways to promote worker behavior that internalized
work discipline. Yet ideas about worker responsibility for working conditions
also placed a loose set of bounds on ideas about employers' capacity to exert
control over the details of production.
Significantly, the labor movement's advocacy of employers' liability
reform developed remarkably late. It was not until the 1870s and 1880s that
Such a qualification of the maxim of respondeat superor would. in a measure, nullify it A
large proportion of the accidents on railroads are caused by the negligence of the ser',ants or
agents of the company. Nothing but the most stnngcni enforcement of discipline, and the mot
exact and perfect obedience to every rule and order emanating from a superior, can insure safety
to life and property.... If such disobedience could be set up by a railroad company as a
defence, when charged with negligence .. . discipline would be relaxed
Id.
77. In dissenting to the adoption of the fellow servant docine in South Carolina. Judge J B O'Ncall
of the South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that slaves" owners could rccocr from hirers when their
slaves had been injured while on hire and that there could be "no difference in the law [between] the
white man [and] the slave." Murray v. South Carolina R.R.. 26 S C.L. (I McMul ) 385. 404 (1841) But,
of course, in Northern free labor ideology that distinction made all the difference in the world See. e i,
N.M. Thygeson, Why Are the Decisions Under the Fellow,-Servant Doctrine So Vacillutng and
Contradictory,?, 31 AM. L. REV. 93, 97-98 (1897) ("A servant is no longer a tool or instrument in the hands
of a master .... ).
78. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, TiE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY' iN TIlE AGE OF RL-,vot.LtO% 1770-1823.
at 346-85, 489-501 (1975).
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work accident law reform appeared along with maximum hours laws, land
reform, and labor conspiracy reform as a central goal in labor's legislative
agenda.79 As the labor movement's adoption of the issue of work accident
law reform in the 1870s and 1880s suggests, however, the changing structure
of work in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was sharply undermining
the material basis of the ideological commitment to the dignity of labor.
E. The Decline of Fellow Servant: Accommodating and Enforcing
Managerial Control
The cruel irony of the common law doctrines in work accident cases was
that the ideal of self-directed work had already begun to lose its salience by
the mid-nineteenth century.80 In the years after the Civil War, and especially
after the recession of the early 1870s, the development of new technologies of
managerial control accelerated and spread to new industries." As a result, if
the notion that workers ought to and did have some kind of meaningful control
over the conditions of their work may have been accurate in some cases in the
1840s and 1850s, by the 1880s and 1890s that notion had diverged sharply
from the sociological conditions of the workplace.
79. The labor movement's legislative demands in the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s centered on land reform
and maximum hours legislation. For labor's political demands in these years, see the documents collected
in 8 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (John R. Commons et al. eds., 1910)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. In New York, labor activists advocated such legislative changes as
land reform, mechanics' lien laws, minimum wage legislation for public works, maximum hours legislation,
and repeal of the law of labor conspiracy, but not employers' liability. See The Congress of Trades, N.Y.
HERALD, July 26, 1850, at 1; The New York City Industrial Congress, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 25, 1850,
at 8. It was only at the third annual congress of the National Labor Union in 1868 that employers' liability
reform became a part of labor's national political platform. See 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 223-
24. In New York, the labor movement began submitting petitions to the legislature for employers' liability
reform in 1881. See Robert Asher, Failure and Fulfillment: Agitation for Employers' Liability Legislation
and the Origins of Workmen's Compensation in New York State, 1876-1910, 24 LAB. HIST. 198, 203
(1983). Yet the lateness with which labor adopted the issue of employers' liability was hardly because work
accidents themselves were infrequent. Although work accident statistics are difficult to determine for the
mid-19th century, newspapers were filled with work accident reports. See, e.g., Accidents, N.Y. TIMES.
Sept. 1, 1853, at 6 (reporting on a man whose foot was crushed in a shipyard accident); Accidents, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1853, at 6 (listing five work accidents, including a railroad accident, a fall from a derrick
in a coal yard, and a laborer crushed by a fall of sand while digging); Affairs at the Brooklyn Navy
Yard-Fatal Accident, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1854, at 5. The infrequency with which personal injury claims
of any kind-including work accident cases-were brought to court in the mid-19th century may help to
explain labor's relatively late embrace of employers' liability reform. See RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM.
COURTING DANGER 20-21 (1991) (documenting growth of personal injury cases in New York City from
0.3% of all cases in 1870 to 10% of all cases in 1910 and finding no work accident cases at all in 1870).
80. See generally DAWLEY, supra note 36 (describing the transformation of work in the Lynn,
Massachusetts shoemaking industry); SUSAN E. HIRSCH, ROOTS OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1978)
(describing the degradation of work among New Jersey artisans); BRUCE LAURIE, WORKING PEOPLE OF
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1850 (1980) (describing the degradation of work among Philadelphia artisans);
WILENTZ, supra note 16, at 107-42 (describing the degradation of work among New York City artisans).
81. See CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 272-81; CLAWSON, supra note 40, at 167-201; JOANNE YATES,
CONTROL THROUGH COMMUNICATION: THE RISE OF SYSTEM IN AMERICAN MANAGEMENT 2-4 (1989); see
also MONTGOMERY, supra note 33, at 6-8 (arguing that the critical turning point in the reorganization of
the firm was the recession of 1873).
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The law of work accidents was not, however, wholly blind to new
technologies of managerial control in the workplace. Accommodating the
extension of managerial control, the law of workplace accidents began to
splinter in the last quarter of the nineteenth century under the weight of a
growing body of exceptions to the common law rules. s2 The exceptions and
caveats that threw the law of workplace accidents into disorder attached to
precisely those characteristics of the organization of the industrial workplace
most difficult to reconcile with the ideal of self-directed work. Thus, courts
developed exceptions to the fellow servant doctrine for cases in which the
negligent employee was employed in a "different department" of a large
corporate employer than the injured employee, 3 and for cases in which the
negligent employee was a "vice principal" of the employer.84
The creation of exceptions to the denial of vicarious liability in work
accident cases evinced an expanded conception of the possibilities of
managerial control.8 5 As Jonathan Simon has argued, liberalizing work
accident doctrines not only responded to changing technologies of workplace
control that rendered old ideas of worker discretion obsolete, but also pushed
employers to make their control of the workplace more effective. Courts
rewarded the perfection of managerial discipline of work by leaving employers
subject to liability for poor managerial supervision of incompetent
employees 7 or failure to enact and enforce an effective regime of workplace
82. See, e.g., Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213. 216-17 (1879) (listming exceptions). see also
Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 14, at 59-65 (describing the %eakening of the common la%% rules);
Comment, supra note 13, at 600-18 (discussing the development of exceptions to the common la, rules)-
In 1912, New York insurance company lawyer Harry B. Bradbury called the soon-to-be-obsolete common
law "a conglomerate mass of heterogenous hodge-podge of rules, doctines and exceptions. sshich no one
pretend[s] to understand." HARRY B. BRADBURY, BRADBURY'S WORKMEN'S COMPE-NSATIO% AD STATE
INSURANCE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES at xiii (1912).
83. See, e.g., Northern Pac. R.R. v. Hambly, 154 U.S. 349, 357 (1894) (holding that the fellow sreNant
rule attached only where the injured employee could be said to have had -contact- %ith the fellos sers ant
whose negligence caused the injury); Gillenwater v. Madison & I.R.R.. 5 Ind. 339. 345 (1854) (ctabhshing
the different department rule where the employee was not able to "participat[el in the duties" that led to
the accident); Card v. Eddy, 28 S.W. 979, 981 (Mo. 1894) (holding that the fellos ,er,,ant rule applied only
between workers who could reasonably be said to have been "co-operating'" %%ith one another in a common
task).
84. See, e.g., Cleveland, C. & C.R.R. v. Keary. 3 Ohio St. 201, 210 (1854)
85. Legislatures joined in the creation of exceptions to the fellow servant rule as %%ell By 1906, sesen
state legislatures had abolished the rule of fellow servant while 18 others had modified it insofar a., it
applied to railroad employment. Twenty state legislatures had modified the assumption-of-nsk doctrine,
several had even moved to a rule of contributory negligence for workplace accidents See Mei n Urofsky.
State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressite Era- A Reevaluatton. 72 J A's MST 63.
84 (1985).
86. See Jonathan Simon, For the Government of lts Sernants: Law and Dsctphnarn Poser in the otbrk
Place, 1870-1906, 13 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 105 (1993).
87. See id. at 117-20 (citing Chicago & A.R.R. v. Sullian. 63 II1 293 (1872)) Beginning vith
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail Road, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49. 62 (1842). courts had suggestcd that
employers could be held liable for negligence in hinng. but courts appear to hase broadened the doctine
in the 1880s and 1890s. See I LABATT, supra note 51. §§ 177-79. at 390-96
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rules and regulations.8 As with employee claims earlier in the century, these
doctrines required injured employees to frame their claims in terms that
demanded not an end to managerial discipline, nor even less discipline, but
rather better and more consistent discipline.89
II. THE POLITICS OF WORKPLACE CONTROL AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The movement to enact workmen's compensation legislation arose out of
a law of employers' liability that had become "'choked and crippled with
exceptions"' 90 and that workers, reformers, and employers alike had come to
see as unworkable. Workmen's compensation reform, however, was more than
an attempt to bring justice and rationality to the law of workplace accidents.
The common law of workplace accidents had reflected and reproduced a
nineteenth-century work ethic that (for all its capacity for manipulation in the
service of industrial employers) had maintained a complex relationship to
informal worker control over the processes of production. The development of
broad doctrinal exceptions in the last decades of the nineteenth century, in turn,
had begun to indicate the breadth of new conceptions of managerial
responsibility for work. The shift to workmen's compensation, then, signaled
a decisive shift toward new technologies of control in the workplace and
toward new ideas about the moral value of work.
A. Workmen's Compensation: Standardizing Costs or Legitimating Control?
To contemporaries, perhaps the most extraordinary feature of workmen's
compensation was the speed with which it completely revolutionized the law
of workplace accidents.9' That speed can be attributed largely to the way in
88. See Simon, supra note 86, at 120-24 (citing Sheehan v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 91 N.Y. 332
(1883)). In addition, statutory and judicial reform of the law of work accidents continued to reward
employee obedience of employer work rules. See William M. McKinney, Statutory Changes in the Doctrine
of Co-Service in the United States, 6 LAW Q. REV. 189, 195 (1890) (noting that, even in jurisdictions in
which the fellow servant doctrine had been amended, employees could only recover for injuries "received
while rendering the service required by the particular employment or in obeying the order of a superior to
which the employ6 is bound to conform").
89. See Simon, supra note 86, at 125. The function of work accident suits, then, was similar to that
of workplace safety legislation enacted in the post-Civil War years. Even as such legislation decreased the
toll of industrial injuries in industries such as coal mining, it ironically increased workers' subordination
to regimes of managerial control in the workplace. See ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, ST. CLAIR: A
NINETEENTH-CENTURY COAL TOWN'S EXPERIENCE WITH A DISASTER-PRONE INDUSTRY 296 (1987); see
also LICHT, supra note 44, at 124 (arguing that railroad workers led a movement from below in the late
19th century in favor of the increased rationalization of managerial authority).
90. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 135 n.59 (1938) (describing the
condition of the law of liability without fault in the late 19th century (quoting SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK,
THE LAW OF FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION AND MISTAKE IN BRITISH INDIA 53-54 (Calcutta, Thatcher,
Spink 1894))).
91. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 397,414-
15 (rev. ed. 1920) (describing the speedy adoption of workmen's compensation legislation and the "mpid[]"
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which workmen's compensation brought together the two dominant strains of
progressive thought: social connectedness and social efficiency. "2 Workmen's
compensation thus found the support of a coalition that included members from
across the entire spectrum of progressivism. Business leaders from both large
corporations and small- to mid-size manufacturing companies supported
compensation legislation.93 So, too, did government labor officials, labor
economists, muckraking journalists, and reform-minded lawyers. In their view,
the dictates of justice and efficiency were fully aligned. As the National Civic
Federation, a prominent gathering of elite business and labor leaders,
announced, workmen's compensation would at once further "'principles of
private right and distributive justice.""
Since the late 1960s, historians have explained progressive business elites'
support of workmen's compensation by arguing that the critical moving force
behind the enactment of workers' compensation was big business's need to
standardize or even reduce the costs of industrial accidents. 5 The evidence
from New York, however, suggests that insurance companies expected
employers' costs to be considerably higher under workmen's compensation
than they had been under the common law regime.' Moreover, it is not clear
that standardization was a "need" of the turn-of-the-century corporate
economy. Insurance already allowed businesses to standardize the cost of
spread of accident prevention measures by employers as a result) The mosement to enact compensation
laws promised, in the words of one insurance industry commentator in 1912. "to sseep like a prairie tire
[across] this country from the Atlantic to the Pacific No prophet is needed to foresee that practically every
State in the Union will soon have thrown the inhuman and obsolete code of Employers' Liability las and
practices into the scrap-heap .... " EDW\'ARD BUNNELL PH ELS. \WORKMEN'S CotPt-NsA-o% I (1i912)
92. For the idea that progressivism was characterized by the interwoven and -soitinetie- competing
strands of social connectedness and social efficiency, see Daniel T. Rodgers. it Searn-h oJ Progr'ssi tists.
10 REVS. AM. HIsT. 113 (1982). Rodgers suggests that antimonopoly should be understood as a third %trand
of progressivism, but that strand played little role in the story told here
93. Indeed, the large corporations and elite labor leaders of the National Cisic Federation, and the
smaller manufacturing concerns of the National Association of Manufacturers--organizations that generally
found themselves bitterly opposed to one another on issues relating to labor-both supported compcnsation
legislation. See Ferd. C. Schwedtman, Relief Tendencies ti the United States. AMl IDt s7RtLS. Aug 1911.
at 19, 19 (writing as the head of the National Association of Manufacturer-' Industial Accident Indemnity
Committee in the Association's trade publication that "' eery student of the histor) of relict ,,heme, for
work accidents in foreign counies knows that compulsory action through stale or federal la., s i, nc.c,,ary
to make satisfactory progress"); Accident Compe'nsatton. N Y TiMt-S. Aug 7. 1911. at II ieporting the
Civic Federation's advocacy of workmen's compensation)
94. Accident Compensation, supra note 93 (quoting a National Ci'ic Federation committee report)
95. See LUBOVE, supra note 5, at 49; Weinstein, supra note 5
96. See AETNA LIFE INS. CO., NEw YORK EMPLOYERS' LIABItLITY AND COMPLNSAno ILAwS 10
(1910) (announcing a 50% rate increase in response to Nev% York's compensation legislation).
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONS ON COMPENSATION FOR INDt STRIAL ACcDi. -"s 7
(1910) [hereinafter CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONS] (noting that insurance rates had nsen under the
compensation act as "we all knew would happen"): Frank E. Las. Letter to the Editor. N Y Tim.-s. Aug
30, 1910, at 6 (reporting that insurance companies were predicting higher rates). Tiii Lnploier Ead
Liability Law, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 12. 1910, at 10 (reporing that an insurance association had recorded a 20%
increase in rates after enactment of the New York State compensation legislation). see ai1o MARK
ALDRICH, SAFETY FIRST: TECHNOLOGY. LABOR. AND BUSINESS I% THE B. ltDIG O AMtERICA% WORK
SAFETY, 1870-1939, at 96-97, 344 n.49 (1997) (arguing that sorknen's compensai on did in fact ha'c the
effect of raising the cost of work accidents to employers).
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accidents absent reform. And as Edward Purcell has documented, many
businesses actively exploited the uncertain outcome of particular lawsuits in
order to maximize their leverage over individual claimants.97
The progressives' own explanations for the need to transform the law of
industrial accidents lay slightly closer to the heart of the matter. In their view,
the common law of work accidents had been created for "domestic or simple
agricultural" occupations. 98 In an "era of specialized labor, [and] of extreme
complex machinery," 99 however, an increased accident toll was now
inevitable.1° What was needed, then, was a "reasonable body of new rules
fitting the circumstances of modern industry."'' l
There was a good deal of truth in the progressives' own account of the
need for work accident law reform. As the recent work of economic historian
Mark Aldrich has established, the late nineteenth century witnessed horrific
growth in the absolute number and the rate of work injuries and fatalities.
0 2
Nonetheless, like the so-called "needs" of nineteenth-century capitalism, neither
the increase in accident rates nor a new conception of the inevitability of
accidents are sufficient to account for the outpouring of support for workmen's
compensation reform. Chief Justice Shaw, after all, had relied on the ordinary
occurrence of accidents in the course of employment to conclude that
employees could reasonably foresee the risk of accidents.'0 3 And while
progressives argued that the wage bargain did not in fact incorporate the risk
of accidents,'1° workmen's compensation statutes did not necessarily or
97. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 63-64 (1992); see also Gordon, supra note 14, at 78-79 (critiquing
arguments from corporate "needs" for cost standardization). Individual claimants were likely to be more
averse to the risk of losing than corporate defendants because loss for the former, unlike the latter, often
meant material destitution.
98. Will Irwin, The Awakening of the American Business Man, 82 CENTURY MAG. 118, 119 (1911);
see also CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 188 (1910) (advocating a departure from
"ancient legal precedents"); REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE
COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF 1909 To INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION
OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS 13 (1910) [hereinafter WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION
REPORT] (arguing that the common law rules had become inappropriate for the "hazardous trades" of the
early 20th century).
99. Irwin, supra note 98, at 119.
100. See WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 5.
101. NATIONAL INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE LEGAL PHASE 22 (1917).
102. See ALDRICH, supra note 96, at 79-91. Aldrich attributes the increase in work accidents to
sectoral shifts in the economy from agriculture to industrial manufacturing, the mechanization of
manufacturing, employer demands for increased production, the low cost of work accidents under the
common law regime, and the persistence of work practices among many working men that sometimes
sacrificed safety for a "manly" fearlessness. See id. Despite the general increase in work accident rates, the
increases were uneven across different industries. On the railroads, for example, the introduction of
automatic couplers after 1893 decreased accident rates in the coupling process. See id. at 25-39, 291
tbl.AI.5. In the coal mines, on the other hand, work accidents increased dramatically in the 1890s and in
the first decade of the 20th century. See id. at 42.
103. See Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 59 (1842).
104. See WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 7 (arguing that the "laissez-faire" tenet
that the market would adjust wages upward in dangerous industries to reflect the risk of injury simply "does
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inevitably follow from that belief. Other reform steps such as minimum wage
legislation or liberalization of the law of labor actions might have addressed
the issue of new industrial conditions by raising wages (or allowing workers
to raise them) in order to incorporate the risk of accidents into the wage
bargain, or by giving workers the power to demand safety measures.
The moving force behind workmen's compensation legislation, then, was
neither the "need" to standardize costs, nor the inevitability of accidents under
modem industrial conditions. Rather, the critical factor was a revolutionary
new aspiration for managerial control in the workplace to generate social
efficiencies. For in addition to noting the inevitability of work accidents,
progressives had begun to focus on new managerial technologies that might
lower the toll of industrial injuries to its irreducible minimum.
B. Scientific Management and Workmen's Compensation
Despite the development of new methods of managerial control in the
decades after the Civil War, the American industrial workplace continued to
be characterized by antiquated theories of management into the first decade of
the twentieth century. In the same years that the workmen's compensation
movement was accelerating, however, progressive efficiency enthusiasts were
remaking the sociology of the employment relation around Frederick Winslow
Taylor's concept of scientific management.
Nineteenth-century approaches to management came under sharp criticism
from Taylor.'0 5 In Taylor's view, conventional managerial practices required
that "each workman shall be left with the final responsibility for doing his job
practically as he thinks best, with comparatively little help and advice from the
management."'06 As a result, instead of a standard practice for a given step
in the production process, there were "'fifty or a hundred different ways of
doing each element of the work," ways that had "been handed down from man
to man by word of mouth."' ' 7 "'IThere was but a remote chance ... that
[any one worker] should hit upon the one best method of doing each piece of
work out of the hundreds of possible methods which lay before him. '
not work out"). Shaw, it should be noted, had not purported to descnbe reaht> so much a. state a normatic
principle of contract law: the "legal presumption" that the wage bargain reflected the nsk of accidents
Farwell, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 57.
105. For accounts of Taylor and scientific management. see SAW EL HAIBER. ElI(7I L.CN A%'D L'PLII-'r-
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA. 1890-1920 (1964). ROBERT KANIG-.A Tin; O'h B--sT
WAY: FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF EmICIENCY (1997): %lO%-TGOMERY. supra note
40, at 214-56; DANIEL NELSON, MANAGERS AND WORKERS 55-78 (1975). and CIIARLE.S P WREGE &
RONALD G. GREENWOOD, FREDERICK W. TAYLOR 97-125 (1991).
106. FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENrIFIC MA\AGEMEMF-%,T 25 (W W Norton
& Co. 1967) (1911).
107. Id. at 31-32.
108. Id. at 112. Thus. Taylor objected to the then-state-of-the-art managerial theor) of creating a
system of incentives in order to obtain the initiative of ,,orkers--, hat he called the "tmtiatie and
incentive" method of management---on the ground that merel) giing ,,orkers the right mcentes, %ould
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Scientific reorganization of the processes of work, on the other hand,
allowed management to "substitut[e] ... science for the individual judgment
of the workman."'0 9 In light of the presumptive incapacity of the worker to
comprehend adequately the processes of production,"0 Taylor and the
management specialists he inspired set out to eliminate the discretion of the
individual worker."' Scientific management's first principle was "the
deliberate gathering in on the part of those on the management's side of all of
the great mass of traditional knowledge, which in the past has been in the
heads of the workmen, and in the physical skill and knack of the
workmen."" 2  Hence, Taylor developed a series of new managerial
techniques, including standardized and minutely controlled processes of
production and maintenance, and stopwatch time-study, to replace workers'
informal know-how with ostensibly scientific rationality. " 3
Taylor's pretensions to scientific standards of management were in fact
absurd," 4 and the dream of completely removing discretionary power from
the ranks of workers was one that could never completely be instituted." 5
Yet the theory of scientific management came to enjoy widespread popularity.
Even when specific programs were not put into action, scientific management
captured the aspirations of management to exercise an extraordinary new
disciplinary power in the workplace, and its widespread popularity among
progressives signaled an acceptance of the idea that the workplace ought to be
reorganized around efficient control of work processes by management.11 6
not guarantee that they would hit upon the most efficient means of doing the job. See id. at 34-36.
109. Id. at 114.
110. Testifying before a congressional committee in 1912, Taylor claimed that "in practically all of
the mechanic arts the science which underlies each workman's act is so great and amounts to so much that
the workman who is best suited to actually doing the work is incapable, either through lack of education
or through insufficient mental capacity, of understanding this science." Id. at 89.
Ill. The science of the expert was set squarely in opposition to the informal worker discretion in work
processes that had characterized much 19th-century production. See id. at 63 (recognizing that the
establishment of "new working habits ... [that were] in accordance with scientific laws ... [was] directly
antagonistic to the old idea that each workman can best regulate his own way of doing the work"). On
workers' bitter opposition to Taylorism, see MONTGOMERY, supra note 40, at 247-49.
112. FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, Taylor's Testimony Before the Special House Committee, in
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 40 (1947).
113. See NELSON, supra note 105, at 56.
114. As Robert Kanigel has shown in his recent biography of Taylor, the means by which Taylor and
his disciples "scientifically" determined the best way to accomplish a particular task were themselves shot
through with arbitrary value judgments. See KANIGEL, supra note 105, at 511-14 (describing the
vulnerability of time-study to "trickery, self-delusion, error, and guess").
115. See GRAMSCI, supra note 74, at 301-10 (observing that discretion is never completely removed
from work processes).
116. Some recent scholarship has questioned the extent of Taylor's impact on modern industrial
practices in terms of instituting particular managerial practices. See, e.g., Walter Licht, Studying Work:
Personnel Policies in Philadelphia Firms, 1850-1950, in MASTERS TO MANAGERS 43, 72 (Sanford M.
Jacoby ed., 1991); Daniel Nelson, Scientific Management and the Workplace, 1920-1935, it MASTERS TO
MANAGERS, supra, at 74, 88-89. As Nelson observes, however, "There is little doubt that Taylorism in the
most general sense, as a conception of management that transcended narrow functional activities, won wide
acceptance." Nelson, supra, at 76.
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Workplace accident law reform and scientific management shared a
common commitment to systematizing and rationalizing the governance of
work. Both movements spoke the language of efficiency," 7 and both
movements sought to realize social gains (social productivity for Taylor and
accident prevention for workmen's compensation advocates) by placing control
in the hands of management. Indeed, by increasing employers' work accident
costs, workmen's compensation accelerated the process by which management
took increased control over the details of production. In the name of "safety
first," American managers responded to workmen's compensation by
developing detailed rules and regulations for particular work processes,
dictating that workers wear certain kinds of clothing and protective gear, and
generally undermining workers' control over their work lives. '
Moreover, both workmen's compensation and scientific management had
abandoned the nineteenth-century linkage between work and the moral virtue
necessary to sustain democratic citizenship. In the place of self-directed worker
citizens, Taylorism posited a social order run and protected by experts who
could distribute social costs in keeping with social benefits. Likewise,
supporters of workmen's compensation argued that efficiency required that the
system of accident compensation be rationalized and placed in the hands of
rational administrative bodies precisely because production was and should be
squarely within the control of management. What was needed, wrote one
commentator, was a "scientific system of working-men's compensation."'" I
"As the apostles of scientific management have shown us," he argued, "we
Americans have wasted foolishly in the individual processes of our
industry."'120 In the view of progressive supporters of social insurance, it
followed from the employer's control over the factors of
production-employee and machine alike-that the employer was responsible
for injuries that might occur to labor. "The wage-worker," wrote social
insurance expert Charles Richmond Henderson, "has special claims upon
collective consideration because he no longer has any ownership in the
materials and instruments of production, nor any voice in management of the
process nor control of the conditions under which his mind and body may
suffer."' 2' In Henderson's view, the economic condition of the modern wage
worker, who was under the control of the "manager of business,"'22
mandated provision of relief in instances of industrial suffering and distress.
Following Frederick Winslow Taylor, supporters of workmen's
compensation placed control and responsibility directly in the hands of
117. See WILLIAm GRAEBNER, COAL-MINING SAFELY IN TIL PROGRESSIVE PEROD 159-60 (1976)
118. See ALDRICH, supra note 96. at 12343.
119. Irwin, supra note 98, at 118 (emphass added).
120. Id.
121. CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON, INDLtSTRIAL INSt RANCE 1% Tl UMIT) STATES 44 (1909)
122. Id. at 49.
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management. John White of the New York Edison Company stated bluntly,
"We feel that such expense [for employee injuries] should in the first instance
be borne solely by the employer as one of the items in his manufacturing
costs."'23 Along the same lines, prominent Baltimore attorney J. Walter Lord
argued that responsibility, not fault, was the true principle that ought to guide
the law of workplace accidents. "The rule of personal liability," he declared,
"rests not upon a notion of actual fault on the part of the individual charged
with liability, but upon the reasonable imputation of fault arising out of his
responsible connection with the instrumentality through which the injury was
caused."' 24
Workmen's compensation thus reaffirmed (and was itself reaffirmed by)
the extension of managerial control represented by scientific management.
Indeed, workmen's compensation also gave rise to a sophisticated new
economic theory of work accident law that served to legitimate new aspirations
for pervasive managerial control. On this view, employers and managers rather
than workers were the parties with the expertise and the power to bring
discipline to the workplace and reduce the accident toll by rationalizing the
processes of production.' 25 As Progressive social insurance expert E.H.
Downey argued, management control combined with managerial internalization
of the costs of production would produce the socially optimal level of accident
prevention and social goods production. 126 The cost of accidents properly lay
with the employer, on this reasoning, because control over work and the
capacity to minimize the cost of accidents properly lay with the employer.
C. Workmen's Compensation and the New Ideology of Work
By raising the price of work accidents, the workmen's compensation
statutes pushed management to develop new modes of control over work.
127
The increased managerial adoption of responsibility for safety in the workplace
in the years after the enactment of workmen's compensation had the important
123. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 130.
124. J. WALTER LORD, EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 13 (1912).
125. As William Graebner has observed, 'The widespread use of the word discipline to describe a
solution to the problem of mine accidents is perhaps the best indication that mine accidents and fatalities
were believed to be caused by an absence of such discipline, by the absence of order and control."
GRAEBNER, supra note 117, at 162. Indeed, the same years that witnessed reform in work accident law saw
the emergence of increased concern among public health professionals for the problem of industrial
hygiene, a development that "emerged at once as a new branch of medicine and public health and, at least
potentially, as a new extension of the managerial hand." CHRISTOPHER C. SELLERS, HAZARDS OF TIlE JOB:
FROM INDUSTRIAL DISEASE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCE 8 (1997). On the new managerial
powers effected through industrial hygiene and their relationship to workmen's compensation laws, see id.
at 110-23.
126. See E.H. DOWNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 9, 15 (1924) (advocating that employers be
required to internalize the costs of work accidents in order to minimize the social cost of such accidents).
127. See ALDRICH, supra note 96, at 104 (arguing that workmen's compensation accelerated the
fledgling safety movement in American industry by increasing the costs of accidents to employers).
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effect of reducing accident rates in American workplaces.' 2t But it also
entailed compromising the kinds of informal worker practices and discretionary
authority that had undergirded the idea of work's intrinsic value.' '
The deep ambiguity of workmen's compensation, then, was that even as
it reduced accident rates and sought to relieve injured workers from the harsh
conditions they faced under the existing common law rules, it accommodated
the law to the removal of workers' participation in the control of their working
lives without conceiving of new ways to institutionalize worker self-
governance. Workmen's compensation did not, of course, cause the erosion of
worker discretion over the processes of production. Many reformers sought not
so much to legitimate the existing conditions of industry as to describe them
and construct some sort of pragmatic solution for the problem of industrial
accidents. Crystal Eastman, for example, in her year-long study of the working
conditions of Pittsburgh, sought to "'work out a law of employers' liability
which will approximate justice in the existing industrial world.'"'" Because,
as Eastman argued, only about one-third of industrial accidents could be traced
to worker negligence,' 3' requiring employers to bear at minimum a
significant share of the costs of industrial accidents could lead to a significant
reduction in the annual toll of work injuries.'
Yet disentangling description from legitimation was a difficult task. If
under modern work processes management was thought to be best able to
prevent the majority of work accidents, disciplining management to require it
to reduce work injuries could, ironically enough, work to ratify such work
processes, and even to accelerate their establishment in laggard industries.'"
128. See id. at 104, 284-314 (documenting declining accident rates and increascd managerial concern
for safety in the workplace in the post-workmen's compensation years). see also Cos110%s & A'sDREWS.
supra note 91, at 414 (arguing that increased safety proisions b\ management .,ere traceable to the
enactment of workmen's compensation statutes)
129. See ALDRICH. stepra note 96, at 7 (arguing that the "safct% first" mosement required sorkcrs to
trade away informal discretionary control in the vorkplace for increased safety). see also Kurt Wetzel,
Railroad Management's Response to Operating Eniplotee Accilents. 1890.1913.23 LAU lIusT 351. 367-68
(1980) (arguing that the safety movement on the railroads was linked to scientific management's attempts
to perfect managerial control over work)
130. EASTMAN, supra note 98. at 188-89 (emphasis added)
131. See id. at 95 (arguing that only 32% of ssork accident fatalities ssere attrbutable to vorker
negligence).
132. The existing law, in Eastman's view, failed to distnbute the cost of accidents "'so as to furnish
the strongest inducement for the prevention of accidents.'" Id at 165
133. Pushing management to take pre% entitve steps %%as a dominant theme in ,%orkmen's compenation
reform arguments. According to the Wainwnght Commission. emploer's gae too little attention to accident
prevention "because the payment for the damages of accident bears %ery little direct relation under the
present system of liability, to the number of accidents" WAI%\% RIGHT COMMISSIO% RiPoRT. siupra note
98. at 7. workmen's compensation, the Commission argued, **%%ill have a real effect in making [the
employer] put his mind constantly to the question of presenting accidents" because it vould -'make the
employer pay something for every accident." Id.; se also John 1\ Gittennan. The Cruelties of Our Courts.
35 MCCLURE'S MAG. 151. 162 (1910) (arguing that "'[tlhe la,, simply encourages cimplo)crs'l
negligence and increases the number of mishaps") Within sescral years of the enactment of sorkmen's
compensation legislation, labor economists believed that the transformation of ,,ork accident law had
caused employers to make new efforts to prevent sork accidents See. e g. CO'sto%'s & A'NDRI&Ss. supr:
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Ultimately, if only through force of repetition, the rhetorical moves proponents
made in supporting workmen's compensation, along with the social efficiency
logic of social insurance theorists such as Downey, helped to construct a new
theory of work. This new discourse of work abandoned the principles of
dignity in and discretion over the conduct of the work process that had
characterized the nineteenth-century work ethic. Instead, it advanced a
conception of work that envisioned workers as mechanistic automatons, that
emphasized the hierarchical nature of the employment relationship, and that
both reflected and gave shape to a transformation of the social meaning of
work itself.
1. Workers and Machines: The Problem of Commodification
Just underneath the nineteenth-century ideal of the worker as self-directed
and independent had been a haunting fear that modem industry might be
reducing workers to the condition of mere machines."3 Progressives,
however, did not resist the analogy of worker to machine so much as they
embraced it as proof of the employer's responsibility to pay for industrial
injuries to their workers. "[J]ust as employers now fix their selling price with
reference to the cost of replacing and repairing machinery," argued the New
York State commission appointed to investigate employers' liability, "so we
would have them make an element of the price of the product the cost of
relieving the injured workers of hazardous industry."' 35 When "accidents
befall machines," complained the editors of the Outlook, "the industry
pays."'136 Why, then, when "those accidents befall men" did they "become
a personal matter"? 137 What was needed, the editors noted, was a legal
regime in which "the cost of the injury to men is put on the same basis as the
cost of injury to machinery."' 138 In progressives' analogies, the industrial
workforce regressed into the machinery around them, as if there were no
middle ground between autonomous agent and automaton.
139
note 91, at 414.
134. By the 1890s, the image of man as machine was able to spark real controversy, as when a New
York audience reacted in a storm of protest to one speaker's suggestion that strikes were the justified
reaction of workers to the "mechanicalization" of the workingman. See RODGERS, supra note 6, at 65-93;
see also TRACHTENBERG, supra note 16, at 38-69. For workers' complicated and oft-contradictory responses
to the introduction of mechanicalized production processes into the workplace in the early- and mid-19th
century, see ZONDERMAN, supra note 34, at 21-62.
135. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 7.
136. Workmen's Compensation: A New Bill, 1913 OUTLOOK 571, 571.
137. Id.
138. Weakening a Workmen's Compensation Law, 1915 OUTLOOK 748, 748.
139. See Edward A. Moseley, The Penalty of Progress, 64 INDEPENDENT 1340, 1342-43 (1908)
(arguing that because both workers and machines are "wasted" and "subjected to wear and tear," employers
should bear the costs of accidents to both workers and machines); Sandy Hook's Guns Roar for Governors,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1911, at I ("If the railroad has to pay for the engine that goes into a ditch, it ought
to pay for the engineer who is killed." (quoting Governor Stubbs of Kansas)); S.H. Wolfe, Human Wear
and Tear, 27 EVERYBODY'S MAG. 758, 758-59 (1912) (arguing that human wear and tear, rather than its
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The problem of mechanicalization was exacerbated by the tendency of
workmen's compensation reformers to equate workers' bodies with money
payments. Holmes had observed in 1897 that the use of money awards to pay
for bodily harm raised the specter of pricing human bodies.' 0 Recognizing
this, reformers tried hard to make arguments that focused on the material needs
of injured workers and their families rather than their rights to
compensation.'' Crystal Eastman, for example, sought to argue that the
existing system of employers' liability commodified the body just as much as
any workmen's compensation scheme might. Illustrating her point with a
photographic plate of Belgian sculptor Constantin Meunier's Puddler adorned
with bold red arrows indicating the price tag that employers had attached to
the eyes, arms, legs, and fingers of the Pittsburgh steel workers, Eastman made
abundantly clear the commodifying impact of the common law;'4 2 in her
view, the only difference between workmen's compensation and the common
law of work accidents was that the common law established shockingly stingy
prices.1
41
Eastman's strategy, however, may only have heightened anxieties over the
implications of paying for bodily damage. Reviewing her book in the Yale
Review, Connecticut manufacturer Howell Cheney argued that Eastman's
proposal for compensation paid through the government was based on a
"mistaken" theory that some "amount of money can rightly compensate for the
life of a husband, son, or brother."' Nagging concerns over
commodification would only increase when, beginning with New Jersey in
1911, states began to move away from tying compensation to lost wages in
favor of set levels of compensation for the loss of particular body parts.'4 5
mechanical analogue, was the problem facing the nation's economy) Indeed. at times the picture of man-as-
machine threatened to reduce the worker still further: In contrast to the machine. %hich Was amenable to
split-second timing and the demands of mass productton. all too often the worker broke down on the job.
See, e.g., DOWNEY, supra note 126. at 7: Daniel Cease. Eniplovers" Labtlt). I AMt LAu LEts REv. 40.
45 (1910).
140. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law. 10 HAR\ L Rtx\ 457. 467 (1897) (-It is conceivable
that some day in certain cases we may find ourselves imitating. on a higher plane, the tanff for life and
limb which we see in the Leges Barbarorum."). Others expressed similar concems See. e g. The Value of
a Man, 64 INDEPENDENT 991, 991 (1908) ("Irrespective and above and be)ond %%hat may perhaps be called
the machine value of a man, there is the man's value as a s ealth producer that is not unlike the value an
heirloom has beyond its intrinsic value."); Mani's Value at 20 and 50. N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 7. 1911. at 7
(noting suspiciously that workmen's compensation reformers had "scientificlallyl" determined the value
of a man's life at ages 20 and 50). On the persistence of such anxieties today. see MARGARET JANE RADIN.
CONTESTED COMMODITIES 184-205 (1996).
141. See, e.g., William Hard, The Law of the Killed and Woiunded. 19 EvERYBODY'S MAG 361. 361
(1908).
142. See EASTMAN, supra note 98. at 126-27.
143. See id. (describing the inadequate compensation receied by soriers under the common law
regime). On this same point, see Buyng a Man's Ant. bv the Corporation Lan-ver Who Made the
Purchase, 68 AM. MAG. 260, 260-61 (1909).
144. Howell Cheney. Work, Accidents. anid the l, %. 19 YALE REv 255. 260 (1910) (book review).
Human beings and money, Cheney argued, were not "commercial equisalents." Id
145. See 3 COMMONS Er AL.. supra note 4. at 603-04 States. had found it disconcerting that a sorkcr
who lost a body part but was able to continue working without interruption would recoser nothing See.
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Elaborate schedules resulted, assigning different dollar values to different parts
of the human body. Both a workman's feet, reported the New York State
Department of Labor in 1916, were worth $6083.61; loss of both eyes entitled
a worker to $5842.08.46 Loss of a thumb, on the other hand, was worth only
$575.08, and the severing of a big toe was compensable by payment of merely
$407.67.' As Holmes had anticipated, there was something in the
systematic and regularized calculation of the value of human life that
distinguished state compensation from the haphazard awards of common law
juries and courts.
2. Industrial War, Industrial Army
If the analogy between man and machine was a recurring theme in
progressive arguments about workmen's compensation, so was the metaphor
of industrial war. In analogizing industry to warfare, the supporters of
compensation were hardly breaking new ground. 148 The great strikes of the
late nineteenth century had seemed to poise the United States on the brink of
a civil war between capital and labor.1
4 9
For progressive supporters of workmen's compensation, the goal of work
accident reform was to turn the trajectory of industrial war outward. The
common law, they argued, "breeds antagonism between employers and
employees" by setting them in an adversarial relation. 5 Workmen's
compensation, on the other hand, would transform industrial war into a battle
waged by workers and industrialists working in concert to push the outer limits
of industrial production.' 15 "When our ancestors made war their principal
e.g., NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR 1918,
at 109-10 (1919). By 1917, all but seven states with compensation laws had switched to the New Jersey
approach. See 3 COMMONS ET AL., supra note 4, at 603-04; see also, e.g., Workmen's Compensation Law,
ch. 816, § 15.3, 1913 N.Y. Laws 2277, 2285.
146. See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR
1915, at 130 (1916).
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, The Communist Manifesto, in KARL MARX: TIlE
SELECTED WRITINGS 221, 237 (David McClellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1848).
149. "The state of industrial society is a state of war," wrote social critic Washington Gladden in 1886,
"and the engagement is general all along the line." Washington Gladden, Is It Peace or War?, 32 CENTURY
MAG. 565, 565 (1886); see also NELL IRVIN PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON 36-71 (1987)
(describing late-I 9th-century fears of an industrial war between the classes); RODGERS, supra note 6, at 34
(same).
150. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 19.
151. See, e.g., DOWNEY, supra note 126, at I ("Peace has its perils no less than war; work accidents
in the aggregate are equivalent to the losses of a perpetual campaign."); Robert W. Brucre, The Welfare
War, 1911 HARPER'S MONTHLY 674, 675 (comparing the casualties of industry to those of the Civil War
and the American Revolution); Snipped Finger Erhibit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1910, at 2 (quoting Albert
R. Shattuck of the Executive Committee of the American Museum of Safety making comparisons between
industrial carnage and war). Edward Bellamy's 1888 utopian novel Looking Backward had anticipated the
progressive conception of industrial army. In Bellamy's account, a futuristic 20th-century America "applied
the principle of universal military service ... to the labor question" and created a national "industrial
army." EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD, 2000-1887, at 57-58 (Signet Classic 1960) (1888).
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business, there was blood," observed William Hard in Everybody's
Magazine. 52 "And when we, their descendants, make industry our principal
business .... there still is blood."'53 The annual loss in industry in New
York, it was remarked, amounted to more casualties than any battle of the
Revolution or Civil War.' Even future antiwar activist Crystal Eastman
resorted to military metaphors: "Extreme caution is as unprofessional among
the men in dangerous trades as fear would be in a soldier," she observed.'
The difficulty compensation reformers thus confronted was not how to
reconcile workers and capitalists so much as how best to compensate "the great
army of American wage-earners in all occupations.''
%
Just as the analogy of worker to machine tacitly conceded control of the
workplace to the employer, military metaphors reinforced the hierarchical
status relation obtaining between the captains of industry and their industrial
foot-soldiers. "It is a maxim of military science," announced August Belmont,
chair of the National Civic Federation's Department on Compensation for
Industrial Accidents,
that it is the first duty of an officer to look after the welfare of his
men and to avail himself of every opportunity to preserve the military
unit from injury or destruction. There is an analogy between this duty
of the military officer toward the soldiers of his command and the
obligation of the employer, who bears a similarly responsible relation
to the welfare of the wage earners who fill the rank and file of the
voluntary armies of industry.1
57
For Belmont, as for others who saw in the condition of industrial workers
parallels to soldiers in battle, compensating workers for work accidents was
part of the broader reorganization of work that entailed increasingly stark
relations of duty and command in the workplace.
3. Transforming the Social Meaning of Work
As we have seen, a wide array of nineteenth-century Americans believed
that work had a morally beneficial effect on those who toiled. "' From the
perspective of the worker, this work ethic was a double-edged sword. If the
152. Hard, supra note 141, at 361.
153. Id. at 362.
154. See Bruere, supra note 151, at 675: cf DOwNEY. 3upra note 126. at I ("Tc toll of life and limb
exacted by American industries during the second decade of the tsentteth century exceeds the nation"s
losses in battle from the Declaration of Independence to the present da) ")
155. EASTMAN, supra note 98, at 93-94.
156. PHELPS, supra note 91. at 2; see also Chaunce) B Bressster. Industrial Mir or Prace. 70
INDEPENDENT 1417, 1417 (1911) (advocating for employer,' liability reform in order to elninate the "state
of continual war between capital and labor").
157. Reward for Injured in All Idustries, N.Y. TIMES. Dec 23. 1910. at 2
158. See supra Section I.B.
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idea that work had intrinsic value could be a source of dignity for workers, it
could also be a tool for employers seeking to enforce labor discipline in
exploitative work situations. But the idea that work could be intrinsically
rewarding was wholly absent from the workmen's compensation debates.
Workmen's compensation supporters conceived of work as accruing not to the
benefit of the worker but to employers or to the public.' 59 The worker
benefited from the process of production not as a worker but only insofar as
he might count himself as a member of the consuming public. Work, in short,
was no longer thought to be important for its own sake.
Workmen's compensation reflected changes in the ideology of work as
much as, or even more than, it created them. Late nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century capitalism had removed much of work's morally constitutive
characteristics wholly independently of work accident law. Yet the impact of
workmen's compensation should not be underestimated. In the enactment of
workmen's compensation, middle- and upper-class reformers signaled their
abandonment of the conceptual link between work and moral virtue and thus
legitimated and accelerated the extension of managerial control in the
workplace; if management paid for workplace accidents, the argument for
managerial control was that much stronger.
Iil. LABOR AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION REFORM
Workmen's compensation posed a difficult problem for workers and
unions. It offered workers and their families a material resource to cope with
work injuries and deaths. But it was advanced in a language of efficiency that
threatened to routinize and legitimize increased managerial control of the
workplace. Workers ultimately supported workmen's compensation programs;
from a pragmatic perspective, the promise of state insurance against industrial
accidents was simply too great for workers to refuse. In their halting support
for workmen's compensation reform, however, labor was obliged tacitly to
compromise the ideals of dignity and discretion in work processes that had
been at the heart of the nineteenth-century labor movement.
A. Employer Fault and the Dilemma of No-Fault Insurance
Workers were hardly unaware of the implications of compensation plans
for control over the processes of production. By the 1900s, workers had gained
considerable experience with the private compensation plans that large
employers began to put in place beginning in the late 1860s and 1870s, plans
159. "[[]f the instrumentality through which the injury is caused be conducted primarily for the benefit
of the individual" who employs the injured party, announced one lawyer, "it is not arbitrary, but reasonable
and just, if he be made to indemnify the injured person." LORD, supra note 124, at 13.
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that were designed in large part to extend management's control over the
workplace by undermining workers' trade union affiliations and increasing the
costs of quitting.160
When workers began in the last third of the nineteenth century to militate
for a liberalized law of workplace accidents, they pushed for the abolition of
the employers' defenses of fellow servant and assumption of risk rather than
no-fault compensation.' 61 State federations of workingmen supported this
type of employers' liability legislation through the final two decades of the
nineteenth century.
162
In championing employers' liability legislation, workers and their unions
sought to establish a principled compromise with the ideal of worker self-
control by emphasizing the idea of blame. In one sense, union support for
employers' liability reform pushed unions to abandon the notion that work in
and of itself was a distinctively important activity in the constitution of an
independent and self-disciplined citizenry: Workers, the unions argued, ought
to be on the same footing before the law as passengers.' 6' But in their
advocacy of liberalized liability rules, workers emphasized the social
condemnation and assignment of fault that accompanied the common law
negligence principle.' 64 In the common law trial, the adjudication of work
accident claims allowed juries of an injured worker's peers to announce the
responsibility and fault of the employer.1
6
5
No such middle ground was available for no-fault workmen's
compensation. No-fault compensation plans smacked of the relief funds run
privately by employers, schemes that had been designed to undermine worker
control and worker organizations.' 66 Moreover, compensation replaced the
160. See Asher, supra note 74, at 21-25.
161. See INDEPENDENT ORDER OF KNIGHTS OF LABOR. DECLARATIO% OF PRI%1t7t' 1-s (1896). Poittual
Programme, I AM. FEDERATIONIST 203 (1894): Edward W Scanng. EMplosers' lDubdili Law. I AM
FEDERATIONIST 93, 94-95 (1894).
162. See, e.g., PHILIP TAFT, LABOR POLITICS AMERICAN STYL. TilE CALIFORNIA STATE FD)ERATIO%
OF LABOR 44 (1968).
163. See, e.g., New York Legislature Enacts Emploiers" Dabtihv Lditw. 41 LOCO'OTIVE F:IREMtEN'S
MAG. 84, 85-86 (1906). By adopting the analogy of the worker to the passenger. worker, presaged the
20th-century labor movement's abandonment of the dtstinctively 19th-century vie%% that production was
qualitatively different from consumption.
164. The National Labor Union's first call for employers' liability reform in 1868. for example.
announced that "it is a notorious fact that fatal so-called accidents have frequently occurred through a
culpable, if not criminal, disregard or neglect of employers generally for the protection of human life " 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 79. at 223-24. See also GEORGE E MCNEILL tE-T At.. THE LABOR
MOVEMENT490 (George E. McNeill ed., Boston. A.M. Bndgman & Co 1887) (decr)ing the "'scand"l" that
a man "must be pauperized" after work accidents and advocating employers' liability reform)
165. To be sure, in cases in which the injury was the result of a fellost serant's negligence, the
liability of the employer would only be vicanous and thus the immediacy of the cmploycr's fault would
be somewhat attenuated. Yet jury verdicts were widely understood to pit sympathetic pools of a %,orker'
peers against employers. See. e.g., Launcelot Packer. The Hazards of Industtv Should the WorLman Bear
the Whole Burden?, 1909 OUrLOOK 319, 320-21.
166. See A. Maurice Low, Shifting the Burdeni-Conipensanoi for Injuries. 186 N A %I REV 651. 655
(1907) (observing that at least some workers opposed workmen's compensation out of fear that
compensation would eventually come out of the workers" own pockets).
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assignment of fault with a system that threatened to rationalize industrial
accidents and substitute professionalized administration without regard to fault
for jury trial on the question of culpability. Finally, compensation schemes
appeared to impose a state-sponsored paternalism for the paternalism of the
employer. 167 Thus, "sore and sad" as American Federation of Labor leader
Samuel Gompers was as a result of the "killing, the maiming of so many of
[his] fellow workers," he sought to effect "their own emancipation through
their own efforts."'
168
As a result of worker suspicion of state-sponsored no-fault insurance
schemes, compensation remained a middle- to upper-class reform throughout
the first decade of the twentieth century. 169 Labor's opposition to progressive
compensation schemes remained strong in some sectors as late as 1910. When
the United States Brewers' Association organized a comprehensive, industry-
wide relief fund with the aid of progressive reformers, rank-and-file workers
bitterly opposed the plan in favor of an insurance system run by the workers
themselves. 70
The difficulty with workers' persistent opposition to workmen's
compensation was that their own employers' liability reform proposals met
with little success. Unions repeatedly found their proposals buried in legislative
committees and simply never acted on.' 7 1 When legislatures did enact reform
legislation, more often than not it was weakened by exceptions to the very
exceptions it enacted and then further weakened by narrow judicial
construction.' 72 Unable to enact their own liability reform program and
confronted with the fact that only twenty-five percent of all industrial accidents
were resulting in payments from the employer to the employee, many workers
turned to workmen's compensation.
73
167. See, e.g., Eva McDonald-Valesh, Conditions of Labor in Europe, 3 AM. FEDERATIONIST Ill, 113
(1896) (warning of the antiunion design of "patemal" social insurance schemes).
168. Gary M. Fink, The Rejection of Voluntarism, 26 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 805, 811 (1973)
(quoting Gompers) (citation omitted).
169. See Robert F. Wesser, Conflict and Compromise: The Workmen's Compensation Movement in
New York, 1890s-1913, II LAB. HIST. 345, 351 (1971). When the New York Social Reform Club proposed
the first American compensation legislation in 1898, the Workingmen's Federation of the State of New
York opposed the legislation, offering instead its own employers' liability law designed to preserve the
common law framework. See IRWIN YELLOWiTz, LABOR AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK
STATE, 1897-1916, at 107-08 (1965). Robert Asher attributes labor's slow adoption of workmen's
compensation to its ignorance of the details of European-style social insurance. See Robert Asher, Business
and Workers' Welfare in the Progressive Era: Workmen's Compensation Reform in Massachusetts, 1880-
1911, 43 BUS. HisT. REv. 452, 457 (1969). Labor leader George MeNeill, however, had provided a lengthy
description of European social insurance legislation, including the German workmen's compensation
program, in his important 1887 book The Labor Movement. See McNEILL ET AL., supra note 164, at 58.
170. See Nuala McGann Drescher, The Workmen's Compensation and Pension Proposal in the
Brewing Industry, 1910-1912: A Case Study in Conflicting Self-Interest, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 32,
42-43 (1970).
171. Asher convincingly attributes labor's failure to get such legislation enacted to the labor
movement's primitive and decentralized lobbying organizations. See Asher, supra note 79, at 205.
172. See id. at 208-15.
173. See YELLOWITZ, supra note 169, at 109-10.
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B. The Ambiguities of Worker Acceptance
Labor began to shift toward support for workmen's compensation around
1909.174 Acceptance of and support for compensation was halting even
then.'75 Some workers, for example, supported a regime of criminal sanctions
against employers for injuries to their employees.'76 Nonetheless, the trend
toward support for workmen's compensation was clear, and nowhere more so
than in the hearings held by the Wainwright Commission across New York
State in 1909. The overwhelming majority of the labor representatives before
the Commission stated their support for the principle of workmen's
compensation. As one Brooklyn labor representative testified, "[Tlhe attitude
of our organizations is going rapidly towards compensation rather than
improvement in the present law."' 77 Or as a representative of the Metal
Polishers and Buffers Union reported of workers in Rochester, "The sentiment
is that we are in favor of it, to have a compensation act."'78
Under New York's 1910 workmen's compensation bill, injured employees
had the option of either suing under a liberalized common law absent the
nineteenth-century employer defenses, or getting no-fault compensation."'
Workers' support for the act was thus understandable since they sacrificed
little. Nonetheless, in turning to compensation, workers adopted (as
progressives had before them) a language that reaffirmed employer control in
the workplace and tacitly conceded workers' lack of agency. "The injured
workman is just as much an incident of the modern factory, as is the damaged
machine," wrote the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners in its brief
to the Wainwright Commission. 8 ' "Both are proper items of operating
expense, and should come out of the employers' profits."'' The secretary of
the International Brotherhood of Electric Workers argued that "[tihe disability
174. See id.
175. See, e.g., CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONS. supra note 96. at 13-14 (discus ing "ioollsh- but
widespread opposition to compensation legislation among uorkers in Illinois in 1910) Gompcr,, %as
curiously fatalistic about compensation reform. 3ee Courts Usurp Power Dclares Gomperso N Y TI%.11s.
Nov. 15, 1910, at 3, but he saw compensation as a wa, of prompting emplo)er, to minke .alet, relorn,,
in the workplace, see MINUTES OF EVIDENCE ACCOMIAN'ING THE FIRST REPoRT 10 1111. LI (,ist,1 Rt.
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CIIAPTIR 5S Of- mu. L,.%,s of.
1909 To INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS" LIABILITN AND OT-IIR MIIRS 92-94 (19101
[hereinafter WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION HEARINGS].
176. See, e.g., WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION HEARINGS. tupra note 175. at 104-05. WAi\v.RtuGir
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98. at 143.
177. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 175. at 102 (statement of Jame-, Bole of the
Brooklyn Central Labor Union).
178. Id. at 219-20 (testimony of Sylvester P. Gartland of the Metal Polishers and Butfer,, Union ol
Rochester). Representatives of union locals indicated that sorkers had discussed ihe isue of compensation
among themselves for months. See, e.g., id. at 219
179. See An Act To Amend the Labor La%%. in Relation to Workmensc, Compensation in Certain
Dangerous Employments, ch. 674, § 218, 1910 N.Y La\s 1945. 1947
180. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT. supra note 98. at 133 (quoting bilef ol 11i United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners).
181. Id.
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of the worker is an analogous thing to the breaking down of a machine, and
should ... be included in the regular charges of the business."''8 2 Gompers
was driven to adopt the idea that workers, like machines, were the
responsibility of employers: "Industry must bear the financial burden of
accidents to the human being, exactly as it does now in case of accidents to
machinery or to other property."' 183 "[T]he fact is," Gompers told the
Commission, "that labor is becoming so divided and sub-divided and
specialized, that the workman has simply to become a part of the machine and
the opportunity for him to demonstrate his individuality and capacity and
intelligence is passing by very very fast."' 18
Like progressive arguments for compensation, labor's language of reform
conceded that work itself had little intrinsic value. Work functioned solely to
produce profits for the employer. James J. Waters of the Marine Engineers
Beneficial Association of Brooklyn testified that "accidents in a large
proportion of industrial employments are incidental to the business and just as
much a part of the cost and the result for which the business is organized and
conducted, as labor or material used in the business."' 85 For Waters, the
worker had become a part of the employer's business, an incident of
production much like the material and equipment of the employer. Moreover,
that business operated solely for the benefit of the employer, not the worker.
Indeed, Waters's argument tracked the views that had been articulated to the
Commission by John White, vice president of the New York Edison Company:
The "expense" of workplace accidents, White wrote to the Commission,
"should in the first instance be borne solely by the employer as one of the
items in his manufacturing costs.'
186
Opposition to the commodification of human labor lay at the center of the
labor movement in the first decades of the twentieth century. 87 Thus, when
labor succeeded in 1914 in having the Clayton Act passed, with its abstract
declaration that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce,"'88 Gompers announced that the Act was nothing less than the
"Magna Carta" of American labor.'89 Yet even as labor was succeeding in
the enactment of the Clayton Act, workmen's compensation debates put labor
182. Id. (quoting a letter from the secretary of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 277, Kingston, N.Y.).
183. Courts Usurp Power Declares Gompers, supra note 175.
184. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION HEARINGS, supra note 175, at 94 (statement of Samuel Gompers).
"That," responded Commissioner John Cotton, "is one of the reasons for paying for his legs and arms when
they come off-I mean that particular tendency that tries to treat him as a machine when you are paying
for it?" Id.
185. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 118 (statement of James J. Waters).
186. Id. at 130 (quoting a letter from John White).
187. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 155-
66 (1991); James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941. 984-86 (1997).
188. Ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994)).
189. Samuel Gompers, The Charter of Industrial Freedom, 21 AM. FEDERATIONIST 971, 972 (1914).
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in the paradoxical position of affirming its status as a factor of production.
Workmen's compensation legislation, to be sure, promised to create a new
degree of material security for American workers. But by tacitly conceding
control over and responsibility for the workplace to the employer, the language
of workmen's compensation reform compromised labor's resistance to
conceiving of work and workers as mere commodities.
IV. CONCLUSION: BRANDEIS'S JURY OF WORKMEN
This Note has sought to show that the transformation of work accident law
reflected and gave shape to the changing ways in which Americans thought
about and organized work. This is not to say that the extension of liability
necessarily and inevitably required a sacrifice in workers' relative autonomy
in the process of production. In the abstract, workmen's compensation
legislation could have offered working Americans a renewed participation in
the conditions of production. Indeed, some viewed workmen's compensation
as reconfiguring on a larger scale the self-help organizations that late
nineteenth-century workers had created to insure against accidents." Yet the
ambiguity of workmen's compensation was that, set as it was in the context
of an early-twentieth-century world of scientific management, it both reflected
and reproduced the degradation of work in theory and in practice.
This was not the only road that workmen's compensation reform could
have taken. For Louis D. Brandeis, the agitation to reform work accident law
reflected a more general need to develop innovative ways to reconstruct worker
participation in the control of their working lives."' Brandeis sought to
resolve the dilemma of work accident law by developing a new institutional
framework in which workers would participate in the governance of the
workplace.' 92 According to Brandeis, workers and employers ought to
participate in accident prevention and compensation on an equal basis."'
Accordingly, he proposed "to secure the fullest cooperation of employer and
employee" in a system of accident compensation and prevention that would
merge the efficiency of compensation with worker participation in the
governance of the workplace.' 94 At the core of Brandeis's joint employer-
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employee scheme of workplace accident regulation was a proposal for "juries
of workmen."'95 Compensation to the injured worker was to be automatic,
but the jury of workmen would independently inquire into the causes of the
accident. It would call witnesses and hear evidence in a public forum, in the
presence of as many workmen "as c[ould] conveniently attend without unduly
interfering with their work."'' 96 As a final step in Brandeis's proposal for a
"Cooperative Accident Insurance Law," the jury of workmen would decide
who was to "blame" for the accident. 97
Brandeis's views appear to have attracted little support. Once workers had
accepted the principle of workmen's compensation, they were extremely
reluctant to accept plans that included employee contributions to an accident
insurance fund. Employers, on the other hand, were presumably loathe to allow
workers within the firm to organize into bodies empowered to assign blame to
the company in cases of worker injuries. Unlike the workmen's compensation
legislation that states enacted beginning in 1910, however, Brandeis's proposal
for juries of workmen found a place for worker participation in the governance
of work even within the world of a large-scale industrial economy.
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